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Introduction 
Contractual boilerplate is a little like property. Such a statement might 
seem like a category mistake. After all, contractual boilerplate language is 
part of contracts, which, unlike property, are freely customizable by the par-
ties. Contracts create rights between those parties, not against the world at 
large. Nor do people who devise new boilerplate terms usually have intellec-
tual property in the provisions themselves. 
I will argue that, in an interesting and overlooked way, boilerplate is the 
first way station on the road from contract to property. In particular, boiler-
plate, like all legal communication, is the result of striking a trade-off 
between communicating intensively in a narrow sphere or communicating in 
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a more stripped-down formal way in a wider variety of contexts.1 Contract 
and property form something close to corner solutions here. Contracting 
parties are allowed to be as idiosyncratic as they like, but the idiosyncrasies 
apply simply to their own dealings—usually not to those of third parties.2 At 
the other end of the spectrum, property law deals in simple stable signals 
with a wide currency, but the rules of property eschew a lot of contextual 
detail. This makes property rights easy to adapt to many contexts and allows 
those whose expertise is minimal to avoid running afoul of these in rem 
rights. The simplicity of property rights also helps potential purchasers to 
inform themselves about the rights in the process of acquiring them.3  
Boilerplate language in contracts is somewhere in the middle of this 
spectrum running from information-rich contract rights limited to a particu-
lar deal to simple standardized property rights availing against “the world.” 
Once this aspect of boilerplate is understood, an information-cost theory of 
property can shed light on how boilerplate is—and is not—used in con-
tracts. By definition boilerplate is meant to be used in more than one 
contract, and boilerplate is more self-contained and less specific to a par-
ticular contract than might be expected from contract theory.4 Boilerplate is 
highly standardized, and when courts interpret boilerplate they treat it as 
intentionally standardized and not harboring unusual meanings. In other 
words, some portability of boilerplate is achieved at the price of tailoring 
such provisions to particular contexts. 
In striking this trade-off between tailoring and portability, boilerplate 
takes advantage of modularity. In general, modularity is a device to deal 
with complexity by decomposing a complex system into pieces (modules), 
in which communications (or other interdependencies) are intense within 
the module but sparse and standardized across modules. Two elements are 
more likely to be in the same module if they are part of a dense web of con-
nections, whereas they are more likely to be part of separate modules if they 
are weakly connected in this sense. Modularity is thus a matter of degree. 
For example, in a computer program, an initial version might have some 
kind of a print function embedded in various parts of the program. Instead, 
                                                                                                                      
 1. For development of this theory where context is defined by audience type, see Henry E. 
Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1105, 1125–28 
(2003). 
 2. And when they do, the law tends to treat these third-party aspects of contracts in a more 
formal standardized fashion than in contract law more generally. See id. at 1177–90. 
 3. Information costs include but are not limited to verification costs. See Thomas W. Merrill 
& Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Princi-
ple, 110 Yale L.J. 1, 30 n.117, 32–33, 43–51 (2000); Smith, supra note 1, at 1125–26 (discussing 
types of information and information cost); see also Benito Arruñada, Property Enforcement as 
Organized Consent, 19 J.L. Econ. & Org. 401 (2003) (analyzing role of verification costs in orga-
nizing property system); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and 
Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. Legal Stud. S373 
(2002) (elaborating consequences of verification costs for a system of property rights). 
 4. Contract theory posits a complete contract covering every verifiable contingency as a 
benchmark, and the puzzle is why actual contracts fall far short of this ideal. Karen Eggleston, Eric 
A. Posner & Richard Zeckhauser, The Design and Interpretation of Contracts: Why Complexity 
Matters, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 91 (2000). 
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one can create a print module that can be called upon by other parts of the 
program in standardized ways. When revisions are being made to the print 
module or to the rest of the program the interdependencies (which I will 
also call “interactions”) are much easier to foresee. If a better print module 
comes along it can be substituted for the existing one, or the success of the 
print module at hand can lead to its adoption in a wide variety of other pro-
grams. With the rise of object-oriented programming this style of software 
design has gained widespread use. 
Modularity carries with it characteristic costs and benefits. Modularity is 
beneficial in that it makes complexity manageable. It also allows multiple 
people to work on a larger problem, often in very specialized ways, without 
incurring the costs of intense communication. Finally, modularity allows a 
system to manage uncertainty; because each module can function and de-
velop in relative isolation, these processes can occur without the need to 
resolve uncertainty elsewhere in the system. In this sense modularity is said 
to create options. Without modularity, keeping the options for certain deci-
sions open would be prohibitively costly. Modularity achieves these benefits 
by interrupting information flow, through what is often called “information 
hiding”; only certain kinds of information can be passed from module to 
module, reducing the need to know what’s going on in the other black 
boxes. As long as the design rules built into the interface are obeyed, 
changes will not have costly ramifications elsewhere.  
Although modularity is increasingly employed in areas ranging from 
biological evolution to organizational design, some of the most dramatic 
examples of the power of modularity and much of our understanding of its 
implications come from the realm of computer hardware and software. A 
key turning point in computer design came with the IBM System/360, intro-
duced in 1964, which was the first truly modular computer design.5 
Nonmodular design that had prevailed before the mid-1960s had become 
much too cumbersome. Similarly in software, the rise of the UNIX operat-
ing system began a similar harnessing of modularity, and more recently the 
role of modularity in open-source software like Linux is well-known.6 Most 
relevantly for our purposes, the development of object-oriented program-
ming (with the rise of languages like Smalltalk, Java, and C++) allowed all 
sorts of computer programs to be more thoroughly modular.7 When pro-
grams become very complex, breaking a problem down by modules rather 
than by flow chart can be key to managing complexity and allowing for 
flexibility in evolution. In this Article, I will draw an analogy between writ-
ing contracts and writing computer programs. 
                                                                                                                      
 5. See, e.g., 1 Carliss Y. Baldwin & Kim B. Clark, Design Rules 6–11, 169–94 (2000). 
 6. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 
Yale L.J. 369 (2002); Greg R. Vetter, The Collaborative Integrity of Open-Source Software, 2004 
Utah L. Rev. 563. 
 7. See, e.g., Grady Booch, Object-Oriented Analysis and Design (2d ed. 1994); Ed-
ward Yourdon, Object-Oriented Systems Design: An Integrated Approach (1994). 
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The role of modularity in boilerplate has been largely overlooked in law 
and economics, for reasons having their roots deep in the Coasean tradition. 
As Tom Merrill and I have argued elsewhere, Coase assumed a hyperrealist 
view of property which bears little relation to the traditional notion of prop-
erty as a right to exclude from a thing, good against the world.8 Instead, 
Coase, like the legal realists before him, tended to emphasize use-rights, 
which in Coase’s case would be the product of enlightened judges making 
economically informed decisions about resource conflicts where parties 
cannot bargain to the efficient result themselves.9 One would naturally ex-
pect such solutions to be finely tailored, and they would have little reason to 
track traditional exclusion rights. In a moment of extreme candor in the course 
of his discussion of spectrum rights, Coase even expresses his view that the 
concept of property “tends to obscure the question that is being decided”10 and 
that “whether we have the right to shoot over another man’s land has been 
thought of as depending on who owns the airspace over the land. It would be 
simpler to discuss what we should be allowed to do with a gun.”11  
The importance of modularity has been easy to overlook in traditional 
law and economics. First, the lumpy character of entitlements and their abil-
ity to encapsulate and hide information does not figure in theories at all. 
Instead, in law and economics more information is usually considered bet-
ter. Exceptions to the more-is-better approach, such as the potential for 
information overload, are not generally considered problems in the theory of 
entitlements anyway.12 Second, traditional law and economics would not be 
very compatible with modularity because legal concepts and formalism im-
plement the principle of modularity, but law and economics inherits the 
anticonceptualism and antiformalism of the legal realists. I argue that for-
malism properly understood is simply one way of striking the inevitable 
informational trade-off between intense communication in a narrow range of 
contexts and more standardized—formal—ways of communicating more 
widely. Finally, law and economics, even behavioral law and economics, 
does not emphasize the benefits of modularity for human comprehension 
and innovation, even though pioneering behavioral economist Herbert 
Simon considered the very notion of bounded rationality to imply a strong 
trend towards modularity in human problem solving and institution build-
                                                                                                                      
 8. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Econom-
ics?, 111 Yale L.J. 357 (2001). 
 9. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1, 19 (1960) (“[T]he courts 
should understand the economic consequences of their decisions and should, insofar as this is possi-
ble without creating too much uncertainty about the legal position itself, take these consequences 
into account when making their decisions.”). 
 10. R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & Econ. 1, 34 (1959). 
 11. Id.  
 12. See, e.g., Wesley A. Magat & W. Kip Viscusi, Informational Approaches to 
Regulation 90–105 (1992) (summarizing controversy and presenting study); Richard Craswell, 
Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U. L. Rev. 657, 690–91 (1985) (noting controversy over 
information overload theory under which more information can cause recipients to ignore all infor-
mation, but noting possible crowding-out effect of mandatory information). 
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ing.13 As has proved true in cognitive science, a complex phenomenon can 
be more amenable to study if the phenomenon itself is modular, as most 
cognitive scientists now consider the human mind to be.14 Likewise, com-
puter programmers are well aware that human minds deal with complexity 
much better if problems are broken down in a modular way. For this reason 
alone, modularity makes for good programming style. Furthermore, evolu-
tion—even evolution not directed by a central intelligence—often gravitates 
towards modular systems because of their ability to adapt to new conditions.15 
If so, the evolution of contract law and of privately circulating forms of boi-
lerplate can be explained as the product of a similar evolutionary logic. 
In the next Part, I will introduce the notion of modularity and demon-
strate that it plays a pervasive role in managing contractual complexity, 
particularly through its use in boilerplate provisions. In Part II, the Article 
turns to a simple model of modularity in which such formal devices reflect a 
trade-off between the information-intensiveness and context-dependence of 
communication and its adaptability to a wide variety of contexts. Contrac-
tual boilerplate falls between highly tailored contractual provisions and 
standardized property rights in that contractual boilerplate presents external-
ities that stem from the lack of fit between language used and contexts that 
the drafter will not fully take into account. The information-cost theory 
helps explain the mild modularity of contracts and why the devices used to 
manage contractual complexity are reminiscent of those in property law but 
much less draconian. Boilerplate calls for a more formal and less holistic 
style of interpretation than do other provisions of contracts. The theory also 
reinforces and refines the view that contract reading costs contribute to their 
simplicity. Part III then turns to indirect evidence for the information-cost 
theory from the limits of the legal realist approach to contracts and the well-
known shortness of German contracts relative to their U.S. “counterparts.” 
The Article concludes with some thoughts on why modularity calls into 
question some time-worn views of law as a “seamless web.” 
I. Modularity in Contract 
Modularity is a method of dealing with complexity, and I will argue that 
boilerplate plays a crucial role in bringing the advantages of modularity to 
contracts. In this Part, I sketch out the nature of modular systems and how 
                                                                                                                      
 13. Herbert A. Simon, The Sciences of the Artificial (2d ed. 1981).  
 14. The landmark study is Jerry A. Fodor, The Modularity of Mind (1983). Although I 
am not claiming that there is any one-to-one mapping between modules we can identify in the law 
of contracts or in contracts themselves and the modularity of the human mind, there are reasons to 
think that there is some relation. 
 15. See, e.g., Modularity in Development and Evolution (Gerhard Schlosser & Günter 
P. Wagner eds., 2004); Lauren W. Ancel & Walter Fontana, Plasticity, Evolvability, and Modularity 
in RNA, 288 J. Experimental Zoology 242 (2000); Günter P. Wagner & Lee Altenberg, Complex 
Adaptations and the Evolution of Evolvability, 50 Evolution 967 (1996); John J. Welch & David 
Waxman, Modularity and the Cost of Complexity, 57 Evolution 1723 (2003). 
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they deal with complexity, both static and dynamic. With this background in 
hand, the modularity of boilerplate becomes one of its most striking features. 
A. Modularity and Complexity 
Modularity is a key device for dealing with complexity, and understand-
ing modularity presupposes a theory, or at least a definition, of complexity. 
This has been famously difficult both as a matter of general theory and as 
applied to the law.16 Nevertheless, for our purposes it is useful to go back to 
an informal definition of a complex system proposed by Herbert Simon, 
whose theory of bounded rationality forms the foundation of modern behav-
ioral decision theory.17 At first approximation, a complex system is one 
characterized by a large number of internal interactions, or, in Simon’s 
words: 
one made up of a large number of parts that interact in a nonsimple way. In 
such systems the whole is more than the sum of its parts, not in an ulti-
mate, metaphysical sense but in the important pragmatic sense that, given 
the properties of the parts and the laws of their interaction, it is not a trivial 
matter to infer the properties of the whole.18  
Modularity allows complexity to become manageable by interrupting in-
formation flow within the system. Forming a modular system involves 
partially closing off some parts of the system and allowing these encapsu-
lated components to interconnect only in certain ways. This allows work to 
go on in parallel and facilitates certain kinds of innovation and evolution for 
a simple reason: adjustment can happen within modules without causing 
major ripple effects. More sweeping change can call for remodularization, 
but much can be accomplished without altering the modular setup. Cru-
cially, human understanding of any system is enhanced by breaking it up 
(“decomposing” it) into modules. Simon offers a little parable to illustrate 
the benefits of modularity: 
There once were two watchmakers, named Hora and Tempus, who manu-
factured very fine watches. Both of them were highly regarded, and the 
phones in their workshops rang frequently—new customers were con-
stantly calling them. However, Hora prospered, while Tempus became 
poorer and poorer and finally lost his shop. What was the reason? 
The watches the men made consisted of about 1,000 parts each. Tempus 
had so constructed his that if he had one partly assembled and had to put it 
                                                                                                                      
 16. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Simple Rules for a Complex World 21, 28 (1995) 
(“The proper response to more complex societies should be an ever greater reliance on simple legal 
rules . . . .”); Eric Kades, The Laws of Complexity and the Complexity of Laws: The Computational 
Complexity Theory for the Law, 49 Rutgers L. Rev. 403, 449 (1997); Louis Kaplow, A Model of 
the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules, 11 J.L. Econ. & Org. 150 (1995); Peter H. Schuck, Legal 
Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42 Duke L.J. 1 (1992). 
 17. Herbert A. Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality (1982); Herbert A. Simon, 
Models of Man: Social and Rational (1957); Simon, supra note 13. 
 18. Simon, supra note 13, at 195. 
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down—to answer the phone, say—it immediately fell to pieces and had to 
be reassembled from the elements. The better the customers liked his 
watches, the more they phoned him and the more difficult it became for 
him to find enough uninterrupted time to finish a watch. 
The watches that Hora made were no less complex than those of Tempus. 
But he had designed them so that he could put together subassemblies of 
about ten elements each. Ten of these subassemblies, again, could be put 
together into a larger subassembly; and a system of ten of the latter subas-
semblies constituted the whole watch. Hence, when Hora had to put down 
a partly assembled watch to answer the phone, he lost only a small part of 
his work, and he assembled his watches in only a fraction of the man-hours 
it took Tempus.19 
Simon goes on to show that if the probability of being interrupted while 
a part is being added to an incomplete assembly is p, then each interruption 
costs on average the time to assemble 1/p parts, and the probability that 
Tempus will finish is (1-p)1000, which is very small for p greater than .001.20 
If p is about .01, then Tempus will take on average 4000 times as long as 
Hora.21 The modular structure of Hora’s watches insulates many parts of the 
watch from the damage of an interruption. 
In software, modular structure can make the program being developed 
more understandable to overall coordinators, at least in broad outline. Those 
working on various parts need not worry about what others working on 
other modules are doing, other than being assured that those modules will fit 
in certain stereotyped ways into the overall structure. This allows work to go 
on in parallel, and a team can develop software that no one mind could 
comprehend in all its details. 
Modularity also benefits groups of many kinds working together. A bur-
geoning literature seeks to explain the modular structure of organizations, 
especially those in the computer industry, as a result of the modular struc-
ture of the products they produce.22 A dramatic example of the costs of 
nonmodularity comes from the development of OS/360, the operating sys-
tem for the IBM 360 line of computers.23 Although the 360 itself was 
modular, the manager of the software project, Frederick Brooks, took a 
nonmodular approach and insisted on attention to interdependencies without 
restriction. Those working on all the various tasks had to keep abreast of 
developments by all the others and inform them about all of their own work. 
The result was a nightmare. Within six weeks the central log in which all 
                                                                                                                      
 19. Id. at 200. 
 20. Id. at 201. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See, e.g., Baldwin & Clark, supra note 5; Managing in the Modular Age: Archi-
tectures, Networks and Organizations (Raghu Garud, Arun Kumaraswamy & Richard N. 
Langlois eds., 2003); Richard N. Langlois, Modularity in Technology and Organization, 49 J. Econ. 
Behav. & Org. 19 (2002). 
 23. Baldwin & Clark, supra note 5, at 6–11, 169–94; Langlois, supra note 22. 
SMITH FINAL.DOC 2/17/2006 11:37 AM 
1182 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 104:1175 
 
this information was kept grew to be five feet thick, and growing at 150 
interfiled pages a day.24 Brooks concluded that past a certain point in adding 
workers, the communications costs of a nomodular approach even exceed 
the benefits of a division of labor.25 
Consider an organization with ten people. The question is which of the 
following organizations is more complex and why—an organization in 
which everyone is connected to everyone, a strictly hierarchical one, a col-
legial hierarchy, or a partial hierarchy, as depicted in these graphs:26 
Figure 1 
Equal Partners/Complete Graph 
 
                                                                                                                      
 24. Frederick P. Brooks, The Mythical Man-Month: Essays on Software Engineer-
ing 76 (1975). 
 25. Id. at 18–19. 
 26. See, e.g., Raymond Greenlaw & H. James Hoover, Fundamentals of the Theory 
of Computation: Principles and Practice 287–313 (1998). For an application of graph theory to 
hierarchies in business organization, see Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Law 801–16 
(1986). 
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Figure 2 









Only the graphs in Figures 2 through 4 are modular. Two nodes are 
likely to be in the same module if they are part of a web of mutual connec-
tions, as opposed to the weaker connections of these nodes to nodes outside 
the module. The more this is so, the more likely a candidate such a group of 
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nodes is to be a module. In the graphs in Figures 3 and 4, the contrast of 
communication within the groups of three versus the constricted communi-
cation, here through one member only, with the outside is striking. By 
contrast, the first graph (called a complete graph because it has all the pos-
sible links between the nodes) is not modular at all. In Figure 4 there is no 
chief executive but a partial hierarchy with three modules, two containing 
three nodes (persons if this depicts an organization) and one with four 
nodes. It could also be the case that some of the links are more important 
than others, which in graph theory is represented by associating a number 
with the link between two nodes. One rough measure of complexity is the 
number of links per node, as illustrated in the following table: 
Links/Nodes 
(1) Equal partners/Complete Graph  45/10 = 4.5 
(2) (Strict) Branching Hierarchy  9/10 = 0.9 
(3) Branching Collegial Hierarchy  15/10 = 1.5 
(4) Partial Hierarchy    12/9 = 1.33 
More generally, for the complete graph the number of links is n(n-1)/2, 
which increases much faster than in the case of the strict branching hierar-
chy (which does not increase at all but sacrifices a lot of potentially useful 
horizontal links), and the two hybrids, the branching collegial hierarchy and 
the partial hierarchy, which are in between. This suggests a connection as 
well to computational complexity theory, the study of the minimum running 
time for programs to solve various problems.27 Some simple-sounding prob-
lems are provably intractable, and many are in a class that is probably 
intractable.28 For example, the Traveling Salesman Problem sounds simple: 
calculate the shortest route such that starting from a given city one visits 
each city once before returning home. For three cities besides the home city 
the number of choices is 3! = 3 x 2 x 1 = 6; for 10 cities it is 10! = 
3,628,800. The problem is that n! increases exponentially, and the general 
problem is probably not computable except by approximation.29  
In the example given in the above Figures, the organization with connec-
tions everywhere seems simple, but consider that communication and 
coalitions could involve any subset of the people here; enumerating the sub-
sets of a set is intractable because the time it takes increases exponentially 
                                                                                                                      
 27. See, e.g., Michael R. Garey & David S. Johnson, Computers and Intractability: 
A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness (1979); Greenlaw & Hoover, supra note 26. 
For an application of computational complexity theory to law, see Kades, supra note 16. 
 28. I am referring to the class of problems called NP-complete (nondeterministic polynomial 
complete, or computable in polynomial time using a random choice of solutions with complete 
luck), which are considered probably intractable (although proving this is one of the great unsolved 
problems). See Greenlaw & Hoover, supra note 26, at 287–313. For an informal introduction, see 
Keith Devlin, The Millennium Problems: The Seven Greatest Unsolved Mathematical 
Puzzles of Our Time 105–30 (2002).  
 29. The Traveling Salesman Problem is NP-complete. See, e.g., Devlin, supra note 28, at 
112–18, 121–28. 
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with the size of the set.30 The other organizations are modular in that within 
modules there is intense communication, but these modules are only weakly 
connected to other modules. In the hierarchical system these connections are 
the vertical information channels. 
The diagrams above can also be interpreted in other ways. For example, 
the nodes could denote uses of an asset that could be the subject of property 
rights. If so, one of the problems in deploying the asset is to decide  
which combination of uses is best. In general the number of combinations is 
n!/((n-r)!r!) for a set of n uses taken r at a time. Indeed, we may not know 
ex ante how many of the uses are compatible with which one and which 
those are. It may be that some uses are compatible if sequenced properly, in 
which case the number of permutations (ordered combinations) is even 
greater, that is, n!/(n-r)!. Moreover, as outside observers we may not know 
the exact makeup of the set. One way to handle this type of situation is to 
delegate the choice of many of these uses to owners who then interact with 
each other and the state in certain standardized ways, as we actually do in 
the law of property.31  
To do this we might divide the world up into assets based on natural 
lines of decomposition and specify modularity between the resulting rights. 
An asset should embrace known complementary attributes, but we can avoid 
specifying them directly, by hiding them behind a simple right to exclude.32 
If A owns Blackacre, this means that A has the right to exclude unspecified 
others from a given space or object (real or personal property). Dutyholders 
likewise need not know much about the owner or the internal set of uses but 
only to stay off and not to commit various kinds of invasions.33 Exclusion 
rights implement the “information hiding” or encapsulation that is the hall-
mark of modularity. As I have argued elsewhere, the law is strikingly 
stubborn about sticking with this exclusion strategy and only in exceptional 
circumstances moves in the direction of direct balancing of uses.34 Indeed, 
despite the best efforts of academics and Restatement authors, the law of 
nuisance surprisingly still affords a major role for the seemingly very arbi-
trary requirements of an invasion (by odors, vibrations, et cetera), which can 
                                                                                                                      
 30. That is, enumerating the subsets of a given set requires exponential time. See, e.g., 
Kades, supra note 16, at 436 & n.103. Even a problem like maximizing the value of a fixed volume 
filled with objects drawn from a collection of objects of fixed value and volume is probably intrac-
table; known as the “knapsack problem,” it is NP-complete. Id. at 440–41. 
 31. For the role of delegation to owners in an information-cost theory of property, see, for 
example, Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 Va. L. Rev. 
965, 1021–45 (2004). 
 32. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk 
Tales, Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 Minn. L. Rev. 129, 169–70 (1998); Henry E. Smith, 
Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. Legal Stud. 
S453, S470–71 (2002). 
 33. J.E. Penner, The Idea of Property in Law 29–30, 71 (1997); Thomas W. Merrill & 
Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 773, 794–95 (2001); Merrill 
& Smith, supra note 8, at 359; Smith, supra note 32, at S475; Smith, supra note 1, at 1151. 
 34. Smith, supra note 31; see also Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and 
Its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. Legal Stud. 49 (1979). 
SMITH FINAL.DOC 2/17/2006 11:37 AM 
1186 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 104:1175 
 
be explained as an effort to enforce the modularity of the property system. 
Likewise property owners—again very surprisingly from a legal realist or 
law and economics perspective—are not held responsible for anticipating 
the torts of others.35 The effect of this is to allow owners to concentrate more 
on the informational problems within rather than outside their module.36 
Only when interactions become serious enough is it worthwhile for the law 
to prescribe the nature of the interaction (as in the law of nuisance or zon-
ing) or for people to contract over them (easements and covenants). 
This brings us to the question of what modularity has to do with con-
tracts. In the examples above, contracting between parties involves a line of 
communication between them that is intensely used and all the more so the 
more their interaction is an ongoing one. A relational contract would involve 
the most information exchange, a simple sale of a discrete good the least. One 
might think therefore that modularity is relevant only to spot market transac-
tions. And indeed it has been noticed before that markets and the property 
rights that make them possible do have the effect modularization.37 Adam 
Smith’s invisible hand is remarkable in that results can be achieved with 
individuals not needing to know much about other people and their goals, or 
why prices are at their current level.38 Each actor’s information is encapsu-
lated but can nevertheless be brought to bear on the decisions of others 
through the interface conditions of the legal system and the market it supports. 
But I will argue that the role of modularization in the law is much more 
far-reaching than this and partly because modularization is a matter of de-
gree. Before turning to contract, it is worth pointing out that property law is 
modular on a more microscale than is often assumed in economics. Econo-
                                                                                                                      
 35. See LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry., 232 U.S. 340 (1914). Wood’s 
treatise describes a rule that is very different from the law of negligence: 
It is the duty of every person or public body to prevent a nuisance, and the fact that the person 
injured could, but does not, prevent damages to his property therefrom is no defense either to 
an action at law or in equity. A party is not bound to expend a dollar, or to do any act to secure 
for himself the exercise or enjoyment of a legal right of which he is deprived by reason of the 
wrongful acts of another. 
1 H.G. Wood, A Practical Treatise on the Law of Nuisances in Their Various Forms: In-
cluding Remedies Therefor at Law and in Equity § 435 (3d ed. 1893). 
For surprise on the part of law and economics scholars, see, for example, Susan Rose-
Ackerman, Dikes, Dams, and Vicious Hogs: Entitlement and Efficiency in Tort Law, 18 J. Legal 
Stud. 25, 35–38 (1989); see also Mark F. Grady, Common Law Control of Strategic Behavior: 
Railroad Sparks and the Farmer, 17 J. Legal Stud. 15 (1988). 
 36. One aspect of this reduction in interconnectedness is the lack of owners needing to nego-
tiate with others. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. Econ. Rev. 
(Papers & Proc.) 347, 354–56 (1967); Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 Yale L.J. 1315, 
1327–28 (1993). 
 37. Baldwin & Clark, supra note 5, at 100–14; Langlois, supra note 22, at 19–20. 
 38. See Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
Nations 423 (Edwin Cannan ed., Random House 1937) (1776) (“By pursuing his own interest [the 
individual] frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to 
promote it.”); see also Vernon L. Smith, The Two Faces of Adam Smith, 65 S. Econ. J. 1 (1998). 
Hayek’s argument that markets are decentralized information processors can also be interpreted as 
relying heavily on modularity. See F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 Am. Econ. 
Rev. 519 (1945). 
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mists, including those of the neoinstitutional school, usually treat property 
and contract as indistinct; property rights are basically any ability to con-
sume an asset in expected terms, either directly or indirectly through 
exchange.39 As with Coase, the tendency is to break up property into its 
smallest constituent parts and ask about the incentive effects each piece has 
on the relevant actors.  
This misses a lot of what is going on. Property law does not atomize 
rights in this fashion. Instead, the default package starts off with a right to 
exclude from a space or thing (tangible or intangible). This is of course done 
because people have an interest in using things and want to protect their 
investments in those particular uses. But at this (foundational) point prop-
erty law does not concern itself directly with these uses. Rather the right to 
exclude is based on a very simple on/off signal, that is, whether a person has 
entered Blackacre, has made off with an object, or has used an invention 
(patent). This permits actors to proceed largely in ignorance of each other 
and allows the state not to have to know much about the internal activities 
and choices of the owners.  
Still, at this point we might say that the only role of modularity is in how 
the rights in the assets over which people contract tend to have some modu-
lar structure. The main source of modularity in property rights would be that 
people are not allowed through contract to alter the basic modular set up in 
the realm of property rights.40 Contracts may also be modular, largely be-
cause parties design them that way. To take a simple example, a warranty 
provision interacts with duty-creating provisions of a contract. We will re-
turn to many examples below. For now, it is just important to recognize that 
modularity is a matter of degree.  
To save on costs among themselves, contractual partners may choose 
modular forms, and there is a growing awareness in the organizational lit-
erature that modularity is chosen in order to manage complexity.41 Even 
asset-partitioning can be viewed as an example of information-hiding and 
modularization: organizational law allows the information about the owner’s 
dealings with his creditors to be irrelevant to the enterprise’s contractual 
partners and sometimes makes information about the business’s dealings 
irrelevant to the owner’s creditors.42 Defining pools of assets and segregating 
them in this way provides for modularity and reduces the complexity and 
                                                                                                                      
 39. Yoram Barzel, Economic Analysis of Property Rights 3 (2d ed. 1997) (defining 
property as “the individual’s ability, in expected terms, to consume the good (or the services of the 
asset) directly or to consume it indirectly through exchange” (emphasis omitted)); Armen A. Al-
chian, Some Economics of Property Rights, 30 Il Politico 816 (1965), reprinted in Armen A. 
Alchian, Economic Forces at Work 127, 130 (1977) (“By a system of property rights I mean a 
method of assigning to particular individuals the ‘authority’ to select, for specific goods, any use 
from a nonprohibited class of uses.”); see also Merrill & Smith, supra note 8, at 358, 376–78. 
 40. Merrill & Smith, supra note 3. 
 41. See, e.g., Baldwin & Clark, supra note 5; Langlois, supra note 22. 
 42. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 
Yale L.J. 387 (2000); see also Claire A. Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74 
Wash. U. L.Q. 1061 (1996). 
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transaction costs involved. It allows for specialization in monitoring assets: 
asset partitioning allows creditors to specialize in which persons and assets 
to monitor.43 Property itself allows owners to specialize in developing in-
formation about their assets. 
Boilerplate exploits modularity, and this modularity in turn allows for a 
greater degree of complexity and specialization than would be possible oth-
erwise. While specialization may arise without modularity, the information-
hiding and standardized limited interfaces between modules enable those 
who are concerned with one module to develop and use information relevant 
to the module without having to worry about the impact of developments 
from elsewhere or ripple effects from their own activities—other than 
through the interface. As artifacts—including contracts and other legal rela-
tions—become more complex, more specialization is called for—
specialization that modularity can support through its role in managing 
complexity. First, at some point the artifact cannot be made by one person, 
which requires division of labor. Even more complex artifacts cannot be 
comprehended in all their detail by a single mind, which calls for specializa-
tion of information.44 Modularity promotes both types of specialization, 
especially the latter. A boilerplate provision about governing law can be de-
veloped by those versed in choice of law without their having to know in 
detail about where the boilerplate provision will wind up—and without us-
ers of the boilerplate provision having to think through all of the possible 
scenarios involving choice of law. Even in more specialized contexts, trea-
tises can offer standardized modular solutions by experts in construction 
contracts or software contracts, et cetera, without the authors having to con-
sider how particular contracts might call for changes in the provision in 
question.45 As we will see, nondrafting parties, supported by drafting party 
incentives and certain interpretive doctrines, can specialize in their own 
business without having to approach contracts holistically.46 And, finally, 
judges can more easily afford to be legal generalists, which is to say they 
can specialize in legal analysis rather than business custom, when a great 
deal of contractual language they have to deal with is modular boilerplate. 
There is little that is mandatory about all this.47 If a business organiza-
tion is a nexus of contracts, then the contracts chosen will be highly modular 
because the benefits in reduced complexity costs are largely internalized to 
the contracting parties. If in some respects it is worthwhile to create intense 
                                                                                                                      
 43. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 42, at 399–405, 424–25. 
 44. Baldwin & Clark, supra note 5, at 5. 
 45. Sometimes a lack of interaction with a relevant context increases the value of the provi-
sion. For example, in insurance contracts boilerplate is used in order to make the contract invariant 
to the actuarial context, thus allowing large pools of risk to be priced accurately. See Michelle E. 
Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 1105 
(2006). 
 46. See infra text accompanying notes 136–141.  
 47. Other than an attempt by the law to channel people into a common vocabulary and rules 
of combination. 
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contractual interaction among themselves, they can do so, but not in such a 
way that information flows increase to third parties, like other property 
owners, courts, and, to some extent, successors in interest.48 
But modularity in contracts is more widespread than such a property-
centric view would suggest, and extends to a realm of contracts relatively 
untouched by contract theory—the drafting of contracts themselves. One of 
the cardinal rules of drafting contracts is to be sparing with cross-references. 
Each cross-reference is a source of interaction (communication if you will) 
between provisions of a contract,49 and so each cross-reference contributes 
to complexity. In more extreme cases, the interaction can take the form of 
potential cycles, which contribute greatly to complexity; some problems 
involving finding cycles are intractable.50  
One source of nonmodularity—that is, interaction—is the mutual de-
pendency of covenants. In modern contract law, a material breach by one 
party can excuse the performance of the other party.51 Thus, in addition to 
the explicit conditions in a contract, which expressly create interdepend-
encies, the law treats substantial performance as a constructive condition of 
the other party’s continued performance. This is a systematic interdepen-
dency between provisions, which the law provides and parties can contract 
around. One can imagine alternatives. Leases are particularly interesting, 
perched as they are at the interface between more modular property and less 
modular contract.52 Originally the covenants in leases were independent; if 
the landlord breached by not providing the premises, the tenant could sue 
but would not be excused from paying rent, and if the tenant failed to pay 
rent, the landlord could sue but would not be excused from providing pos-
session to the tenant.53 In this, traditional leases were quite modular, but at 
some cost. The model of independent covenants was not well suited in 
particular to tenants whose expectation was (as it increasingly is) to ac-
quire the services of a place to stay rather than a mini-property interest 
that gives them more discretion and more risk.54 Modern landlord-tenant 
law has gone a long way towards making covenants interdependent, but 
perhaps not quite as far in as in the law of contracts. This trend decreases 
the modularity of these provisions. 
                                                                                                                      
 48. See Smith, supra note 1, at 1139–48, 1177–90. 
 49. This is also a rule for drafters of statutes. For a very interesting article on statutory draft-
ing that recognizes the benefits of modularity through an analogy to object-oriented programming, 
see Thomas F. Blackwell, Finally Adding Method to Madness: Applying Principles of Object-
Oriented Analysis and Design to Legislative Drafting, 3 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 227 (2000). 
 50. See Kades, supra note 16, at 445–66. 
 51. See, e.g., E. Allan Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts § 8.16 (3d ed. 2004). 
 52. For an argument that landlord-tenant law is intermediate between in rem and in per-
sonam and also correspondingly intermediate in its degree of mandatoriness, see Merrill & Smith, 
supra note 33, at 820–33.  
 53. Paradine v. Jane, (1647) 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B.). 
 54. Merrill & Smith, supra note 33, at 822–25. 
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Another major source of modularity in contracts is the section on defini-
tions. Definitions are now regarded with some suspicion because of doubts 
about the limits of language. These concerns are, I will argue, often over-
stated, and I return to the question of interpretation and formalism below. 
While recognizing that no definition can be totally context-independent, 
spelling out definitions increases modularity in at least two ways.  
One is that the more explicit and formal the definition is, the less the 
contract interacts with the contracting context—other provisions of the con-
tract, the parties’ behavior, and the rest of the transacting context. 
Evidentiary rules associated with contracts increase contractual modularity. 
Again, I will return to a more precise approach to formalism below, but 
formalism is, I have argued, a matter of degree; instead of complete formal-
ism or complete context-dependence, the law of necessity calls for 
differential formalism.55 The definitions allow closer approximation to a 
plain-meaning or four-corners approach.56 The sneering by some (but not 
all) legal realists and their successors at such rules is a little misplaced.57 The 
real question is whether the reduction in complexity costs from such defini-
tions is worth the cost of devising them and the costs of potential distortions 
inherent in any attempt at formal definitions in contracts.  
Definitions also function as modules themselves. As in a computer pro-
gram, other parts of the contract can “call upon” them without the need to 
spell things out each time (which would entail a risk of error). Furthermore, 
if definitions are not segregated and done once and for all, contracts are 
open to an interpretive strategy where a use of the term in one part of the 
contract can more easily be used in interpreting the term in another part of 
the contract. This type of interpretation involves far more potential interac-
tion—and hence more complexity—than in the case of a contract with a 
section on definitions. Concerns about nonexpert factfinders, and juries in 
particular, will be at their height in situations of high interaction.58 Also, in a 
modular structure, errors in interpreting one part of a contract—here some 
part related to a definition of a term—will be less likely to cause ripple er-
rors elsewhere in the contract. But this insulation comes at a cost. It will be 
only those terms that occur often and are subject to the problems of holistic, 
highly complex interpretation that are good candidates for modular treat-
ment. It turns out that boilerplate, while more internally complex than 
definitions, externally serves a very similar role in promoting modularity 
and managing complexity in contracts. 
                                                                                                                      
 55. Smith, supra note 1, at 1167–90. 
 56. Id. at 1177–83. One aspect of differential formalism is the type of evidence admitted on 
contract interpretation questions. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the 
Limits of Contract Law, 113 Yale L.J. 541, 568–94 (2003). 
 57. See Smith supra note 1, at 1177–83; see also infra Section III.A.  
 58. Cf. Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation (John M. Olin 
Program in Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 229, 2004). To this list may be added the objective 
theory of contract. See Joseph M. Perillo, The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract Forma-
tion and Interpretation, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 427 (2000). 
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B. Modular Boilerplate 
As contractual provisions go, boilerplate is characterized by a high de-
gree of modularity. The word “boilerplate” has two senses, a wider and a 
narrower one. The broad “boilerplate” refers to any standardized term in a 
contract. But the word can also be used to refer to provisions that typically 
are found at the end of a contract and deal with recurring matters like as-
signment and delegation, successors and assigns, third-party beneficiaries, 
governing law and forum selection, waiver of jury trial, arbitration, reme-
dies, indemnities, force majeure, transaction costs, confidentiality, 
announcements and notices, amendment and waiver, severability, merger, 
and captions.59 It is this type of boilerplate that I will be mainly concerned 
with in this Article. 
Two of the most common types of boilerplate are governing law and 
severability provisions. Each of these typically occurs near the end of a con-
tract. I argue that a quick survey of actual use of these provisions reveals a 
much higher degree of modularity than one would expect on the view of 
processing costs implicitly adopted in standard contract theory. 
Consider first governing law or choice of law provisions. Most such 
provisions select the law of a single state or, even more commonly, a single 
state’s law except for that state’s conflict of laws rules. In a quick search of 
the Contracts and Organizations Research Institute (“CORI”) contracts li-
brary,60 out of 220 governing law provisions, the largest group specified one 
jurisdiction (215 out of 220). Of these 215 clauses, there are three types. 
First, the seemingly simplest choice of law provisions (79 out of the 215 
one-state clauses) select the laws of one state without qualification: 
GOVERNING LAW This Agreement shall be construed in accordance 
with the laws of the State of Nevada.61 
Second, about one and one-half times as commonly (120), one-state 
provisions select one jurisdiction except for that jurisdiction’s choice of law, 
which could otherwise point to the laws of another jurisdiction. A typical 
example of the latter reads: 
                                                                                                                      
 59. See, e.g., Tina L. Stark, Negotiating and Drafting Contract Boilerplate, at vii–
xxii, 5 (2003). 
 60. The Digital Contracts Library of the Contracting and Organizations Research Institute 
(“CORI”) [hereinafter CORI Contracts Library] is available with free registration at 
http://cori.missouri.edu. An initial search of the CORI Contracts Library was run on December 4, 
2005 for the phrase “governing law” contained in contracts filed between January 1, 2003 and De-
cember 31, 2004. This search yielded 22,280 contracts. A subset was created by sorting the results 
by CORI Contract ID number and taking the first contract of each set of 100, along with the first 
contract of the last group. This yielded 223 contracts. (A search for “choice of law” gave more re-
sults but may skew the analysis in favor of the “other than choice of law” provisions, because such 
provisions also use the phrase “choice of law.”) 
 61. Employment Agreement among Coi Solutions, Inc., Naipaul Communications, and 
Geeta Naipaul-Denton § 20 (Sept. 30, 2001) (CORI Contract ID No. 1868), available at CORI 
Contract Library, supra note 60. 
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Governing Law. This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in ac-
cordance with the laws of the State of Ohio, without regard to the choice-
of-laws or conflicts-of-laws provisions thereof.62  
Notice that this increases modularity and predictability. The law of Ohio 
here will apply without interaction with parts of the context relevant to 
Ohio’s choice of law rules. Third and very similarly, some contracts (thir-
teen) choose the laws applicable to contracts made and to be performed 
wholly within that state, sometimes along with an agreement that the con-
tract is such a contract: 
Governing Law. The interpretation and construction of this Agreement, 
and all matters relating hereto, shall be governed by the laws of the State 
of New York applicable to agreements executed and to be performed solely 
within such State.63 
Finally, a few (three) combined the language about applying the laws of one 
state without regard to conflict of laws with a clause about applying the law 
of that state that governs contracts made and to be performed entirely within 
such state. 
Very rarely (five out of 220) did a contract select more than one jurisdic-
tion or tailor the governing law provision by issue. For example, this could 
be a split by time: 
GOVERNING LAW: THIS AGREEMENT AND THE RIGHTS AND 
OBLIGATIONS OF THE PARTIES HERETO SHALL BE GOVERNED, 
CONSTRUED AND ENFORCED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE 
LAWS OF THE STATE OF UTAH UNTIL THE FINALIZATION OF 
THE FAIRNESS HEARING AND ENTRY OF ORDER REFERENCED 
IN PARAGRAPH 2, ABOVE, AND SAID FAIRNESS HEARING MUST 
BE BROUGHT AND CONCLUDED IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE 
OF UTAH; THEREAFTER, THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE PARTIES 
HERETO SHALL BE GOVERNED, CONSTRUED AND ENFORCED 
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAWS OF THE STATE NEW MEXICO 
AND THE PARTIES AGREE THAT OTHER THAN AS SET FORTH 
ABOVE, ANY LITIGATION RELATING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY 
TO THIS AGREEMENT MUST BE BROUGHT BEFORE AND 
DETERMINED BY A COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION 
WITHIN THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO.64 
Or it could be a split by issue: 
                                                                                                                      
 62. Stock Purchase Agreement by and among Trimas Company LLC, The Shareholders and 
Option Holders of Highland Group Corporation, and FNL Management Corp. § 11.12 (Feb. 21, 
2003) (CORI Contract ID No. 1448), available at CORI Contract Library, supra note 60 . 
 63. Preferred Stock Subscription Agreement Between Gregory Abbott and International 
Dispensing Corporation § 8.3 (Jan. 24, 2003) (CORI Contract ID No. 9), available at CORI Con-
tract Library, supra note 60. 
 64. Acquisition Agreement between United States Oil Company and Rocky Mountain En-
ergy Corporation § 26 (filed Jan. 14, 2003) (CORI Contract ID No. 4127), available at CORI 
Contract Library, supra note 60. 
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Governing Law. This Exchange and Registration Rights Agreement shall 
be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of 
New York except that the authorization and execution of this Exchange and 
Registration Rights Agreement by the Guarantor shall be governed by the 
laws of the United Mexican States.65 
Interestingly, even though they do not seem significantly more expensive to 
write, the sample contains only one provision that makes reference to the 
laws of more than two jurisdictions: 
GOVERNING LAW; JURISDICTION. This Supplemental Indenture shall 
be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of 
California except (i) with respect to Article III hereof and the Guarantee, 
which shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of 
the State of New York, without regard to conflicts of law provisions and 
(ii) with respect to authorization and execution of this Supplemental Inden-
ture by or on behalf of the Guarantor which are required to be governed by 
the laws of the Netherlands. . . .66 
Even here conflict of law principles and rules are cut off.  
In two of these multiple-jurisdiction clauses, the split is more apparent 
than real, because the parties are simply (and redundantly) acknowledging 
that a different state’s law will apply to the internal affairs of a corporation 
or a trust involved in the contract: 
(f) Governing Law. The corporate law of the State of Delaware will govern 
all issues concerning the relative rights of the Company and its stockhold-
ers. All other issues concerning this Agreement shall be governed by and 
construed in accordance with the laws of the State of New York without 
giving effect to any choice of law or conflict of law provision or rule 
(whether of the State of New York or any other jurisdiction) that would 
cause the application of the law of any jurisdiction other than the State of 
New York.67 
Another similarly selects California law for an indenture but makes an ex-
ception for the New York trust law to be applied to the trustee.68 
The overwhelming selection of one state, especially barring choice of law, 
makes for extreme modularity. By selecting one state, these contracts are dis-
placing off-the-rack law that might involve nonmodular and hard-to-foresee 
                                                                                                                      
 65. Letter Agreement—Exchange And Registration Rights Agreement—Pemex Project 
Funding Master Trust between Petroleos Mexicanos and Credit Suisse First Boston LLC § 18(e) 
(June 4, 2003) (CORI Contract ID No. 64272) (emphasis on entire passage omitted), available at 
CORI Contract Library, supra note 60. 
 66. Supplemental Indenture among Transamerica Finance Corp, Aegon NV and BNY Mid-
west Trust Co § 6.8 (filed Aug. 27, 2003) (CORI Contract ID No. 63374), available at CORI 
Contract Library, supra note 60. 
 67. Executive Agreement between Ziff Davis Holdings Inc., Ziff Davis Publishing Inc., and 
Gregory Barton § 18(f) (October 23, 2002) (CORI Contract ID No. 42453) (emphasis on entire 
passage omitted), available at CORI Contract Library, supra note 60. 
 68. Indenture between WFS Financial 2003-1 Owner Trust and [a New York banking corpo-
ration in its capacity as trustee] § 11.13 (filed Mar. 25, 2003) (CORI Contract ID No. 48455), 
available at CORI Contract Library, supra note 60. 
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choice of law questions, including the potential of cycling. By blocking a 
state’s conflict of laws rules, the provision is even more modular: the choice 
of the law of a certain state will not vary with changes in the business or 
contract context.69 Here increased length promotes simplicity through modu-
larity.  
Again, it is not writing costs that prevent more tailored governing law 
provisions than the foregoing boilerplate. Tailored provisions like the “three-
way” governing law provision or ones even more nuanced than that are not 
prohibitive to write. The real problem, I suggest, is their nonmodularity, lead-
ing to “reading costs” as I will interpret that term. The benefits from tailoring 
do not outweigh the greater complexity stemming from interactions. 
Severability clauses serve modularity in multiple ways. Their purpose is 
to make the validity and enforceability of provisions less interdependent, 
which increases modularity. The validity of each provision can be consid-
ered more in isolation than in the absence of severability. As in many 
systems, modularity insulates the system as a whole from the failure of one 
part. A severability provision in a contract can be taken as an expression by 
the parties for modularity and against remodularization by courts.  
Severability provisions also are very modular in that they apply across 
the board. A typical provision will apply to the entire contract: 
SEVERABILITY OF THIS AGREEMENT. If any provision of this 
Agreement shall be judicially determined to be invalid, illegal or unen-
forceable, the validity, legality and enforceability of the remaining 
provisions shall not in any way be affected or impaired thereby.70 
We overwhelmingly do not find provisions that make some proper sub-
set of the contract’s provisions severable. In a quick search of a sample of 
contracts from the CORI database, most (147 of 156) containing a severabil-
ity clause had the across-the-board type like the one above.71 Again the 
problem is not writing costs, especially when one considers that thirty-six 
out of the 147 had one of several related extra provisions mostly to the ef-
fect that if a provision was severed the parties would bargain in good faith to 
replace it with a similar but valid one.72 Moreover, advice books promote the 
                                                                                                                      
 69. For an interesting discussion of how adding this and several further phrases to a choice 
of law provision prevent complicated issues from arising, see Stark, supra note 59, § 6.02[3], at 
120. 
 70. Warrant Repricing Agreement Among Aradigm Corporation and Holders § 8.5 (Feb. 10, 
2003) (CORI Contract ID No. 1470), available at CORI Contract Library, supra note 60. 
 71. CORI, Contract Search, http://ronald.cori.missouri.edu/cori_search/client_search.php 
(last visited Jan. 11, 2006). The initial search, performed on December 2, 2005, was for “severabil-
ity” in contracts filed between January 1, 2003 and December 31, 2004 (15,502 contracts), taking 
the first of every group of 100 along with the first contract of the last group, listed by CORI ID 
number, for a total of 156 contracts.  
 72. See, e.g., Joint Management Agreement among SGN LLC, Dex Holdings LLC, Qwest 
Dex, Inc, and Qwest Communications International Inc. § 8.8 (Nov. 8, 2002) (CORI Contract ID 
No. 3527), available at CORI Contract Library, supra note 60 (“SEVERABILITY. If any provision 
of this Agreement is held to be unenforceable for any reason, it will be adjusted rather than voided, 
if possible, to achieve the intent of the Parties. All other provisions of this Agreement will be 
deemed valid and enforceable to the extent possible.”); Separation Agreement between DOR Bio-
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idea of drafting an “essential terms” clause, which specifies particular terms 
whose invalidity or unenforceability will cause the contract as a whole to fail. 
And there were only a few examples splitting by the criterion of essentialness: 
PARTIAL INVALIDITY AND SEVERABILITY. All rights and restric-
tions contained herein may be exercised and shall be applicable and 
binding only to the extent that they do not violate any applicable laws and 
are intended to be limited to the extent necessary to render this Agreement 
legal, valid and enforceable. If any term of this Agreement, or part thereof, 
not essential to the commercial purpose of this Agreement shall be held to 
be illegal, invalid or unenforceable by a court of competent jurisdiction, it 
is the intention of the parties that the remaining terms hereof, or part 
thereof shall constitute their agreement with respect to the subject matter 
hereof and all such remaining terms, or parts thereof, shall remain in full 
force and effect. To the extent legally permissible, any illegal, invalid or 
unenforceable provision of this Agreement shall be replaced by a valid 
provision which will implement the commercial purpose of the illegal, in-
valid or unenforceable provision.73 
Again, these do not seem too expensive to write.74 Either of these ap-
proaches, based on inferring intent or essentialness, involve a higher degree 
of interdependency with the rest of the contract, because it will depend on 
the rest of the contract and the context of the deal what the overall intent of 
the parties is or whether a given provision is essential.  
A couple of contracts have a severability provision that is general with 
only a narrow exception, thus keeping the interaction localized. One con-
tract referred to a specific issue for special treatment (in the nature of an 
acceleration clause): 
Severability. In case one or more provisions, or part thereof, contained in 
this Agreement or in any of the other Financing Documents shall be inva-
lid, illegal or unenforceable in any respect under any Law, then without 
need for any further agreement, notice or action: 
(a) The validity, legality and enforceability of the remaining provisions 
shall remain effective and binding on the parties thereto and shall not be 
affected or impaired thereby; 
(b) The obligation to be fulfilled shall be reduced to the limit of such  
validity; 
                                                                                                                      
Pharma, Inc. and Colin Bier § 13 (June 13, 2002) (CORI Contract ID No. 7036), available at CORI 
Contract Library, supra note 60 (“Severability. If any provision of this Agreement is, for any reason, 
invalid or unenforceable, the remaining provisions of this Agreement will nevertheless be valid and 
enforceable and will remain in full force and effect. Any provision of this Agreement that is held 
invalid or unenforceable by a court of competent jurisdiction will be deemed modified to the extent 
necessary to make it valid and enforceable and as so modified will remain in full force and effect.”). 
 73. Agreement for Purchase and Sale of Assets Among Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., Arris Interna-
tional, Inc., and Texscan De Mexico, S.A. De C.V. § 12.6 (Nov. 13, 2002) (CORI Contract ID No. 
14121), available at CORI Contract Library, supra note 60. 
 74. See, e.g., Stark, supra note 59, § 17.05[3], at 552–53. 
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(c) If such provision or part thereof pertains to the repayment of the Obli-
gations, then, at the sole and absolute discretion of the Lender, all of the 
Obligations shall become immediately due and payable; and 
(d) If the affected provision or part thereof does not pertain to repayment of 
the Obligations, but operates or would prospectively operate to invali-
date this Agreement in whole or in part, then such provision or part 
thereof only shall be void, and the remainder of this Agreement shall 
remain operative and in full force and effect.75 
One other contract, an employment agreement, has a severability clause that 
governs within one section of the contract (on the protection of confidential 
information) and a general severability provision for the rest of the con-
tract.76 Tailored severability clauses in actual contracts are quite rare, despite 
the conventional advice and the apparent low cost of drafting. 
Boilerplate contributes to modularity in contracts in specific ways. The 
functions of modularity can be captured by a variety of “modular operators,”77 
and one can find boilerplate serving these more specific functions as well. 
1. Splitting or Decomposition 
Modularity involves splitting a system into relatively autonomous com-
ponents. Simon refers to a decomposable or nearly decomposable system. 
Decomposability is a matter of degree. The more each module is isolated, 
the more decomposable the system. The trick is to find the natural fault lines 
in a problem.78 In property these fault lines are around groups of comple-
mentary attributes and sometimes track prelegal natural boundaries.79 To 
some extent modularity can be imposed on a system by preventing some 
communication that would have some positive benefit. To take a property 
example from earlier, surely there would be some benefit in holding people 
responsible for knowing the particular features of an owner and holding 
owners responsible for anticipating the torts of others, but this benefit is 
probably quite small in comparison to the large addition to the complexity 
of the problems facing owners and dutyholders.80 Likewise with the numerus 
clausus, which limits the forms of property to a fixed and finite list: one 
might be able to find some property arrangement that is made prohibitively 
                                                                                                                      
 75. Financing Agreement between Town And Country Trust, TC Operating Limited Partner-
ship, and TC Property Company II; and First National Bank Of Maryland § 8.4 (Sept. 25, 1998) 
(CORI Contract ID No. 8023), available at CORI Contract Library, supra note 60. 
 76. Employment Agreement Between Power Efficiency Corporation and Raymond J. Skip-
tunis § 14 (Nov. 7, 2002) (CORI Contract ID No. 2601), available at CORI Contract Library, supra 
note 60; id. § 10. This nesting promotes modularity over clause that directly separated an issue like 
the protection of confidential information out for special treatment. 
 77. Baldwin & Clark, supra note 5, at 12–13, 123–46.  
 78. See, e.g., Langlois, supra note 22, at 24–26; Simon, supra note 13, at 195–98. This is 
sometimes called “factoring.” 
 79. See supra note 32. 
 80. See supra notes 33–36. 
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costly by the numerus clausus principle, but some such frustration costs will 
be worthwhile to incur in the interests of greater modularization.81 In the 
case of property interests, these frustration costs are kept lower than they 
otherwise would be because the very simple rules for combining basic inter-
ests feed each other—and themselves—allowing them, like Lego blocks, to 
accomplish a surprisingly wide variety of objectives at low cost.82 In boiler-
plate, certain parts of the contract are hived off into sections that deal with 
questions like choice of law or arbitration. 
2. Substitution 
Because modules only interact in specified ways consistent with an 
overall general function they are supposed to perform (again, think of a 
print-control module in a computer program), one module can be substituted 
for another as long as they perform the specified function. This principle is 
put to widespread and powerful use in object-oriented programming, where 
functions are made into objects that have hidden internal structure and that 
can be substituted for one another. One of the great attractions of boilerplate 
is that one provision can be substituted for another related provision. 
3. Augmentation 
If an issue is suitable for modular treatment, a new module can be added 
to the system without much disruption to the rest. Thus on some issues like 
choice of law, boilerplate can be added without having to worry about ex-
tensive revisions elsewhere in the contract. 
Notice that the addition of a module of boilerplate can be regarded as ei-
ther substitution or augmentation depending on whether the frame of 
reference is the contract itself or the contract as embedded in the back-
ground of the common law or statute. Thus, to take the example of choice of 
law again, adding a choice of law provision to a contract that lacks one is 
augmentation if we are considering the contract as the system. But if the 
contract plus off-the-rack law is taken as the system, the addition of the 
choice of law boilerplate is the substitution of the boilerplate for the off-the-
rack law (which might prescribe the state in which the business dealings 
occurred as a default.) Precisely because the law of contractual defaults is 
supposed to apply transsubstantively to a wide variety of contracts, it is 
likely to be at least as modular as the boilerplate that might displace it.83 
Furthermore, because contractual defaults might be expected to be very 
modular, when commentators have argued over whether defaults should be 
                                                                                                                      
 81. Merrill & Smith, supra note 3, at 35–38. 
 82. Id. at 36–37. 
 83. Before one could decide on the optimal degree of modularity here one would have to 
recognize that any tendency of courts to favor off-the-rack defaults as presumptively fair and to 
make contracting around them difficult might result in too much modularity in contracts. See 
Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions 
Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 261 (1985). 
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more tailored to particular business contexts, the more salient advantages of 
such tailoring must be offset against the loss of the advantages of modularity 
that are the focus of this Article.84 
4. Exclusion 
Likewise, a module can be subtracted without major perturbations. For 
example the choice of law boilerplate module can be subtracted and the 
general off-the-rack choice of law principles will apply. Consider the previ-
ous examples of augmentation, which could work in reverse (for example, 
striking a choice of law boilerplate provision). This is modularity acting 
through the operator of exclusion. 
5. Inversion 
The process of inversion takes a previously hidden function, often re-
peated in many modules, and factors it out, moving it higher up in the 
hierarchy of the design so that it is visible and can be called upon by the 
various other modules.85 In software a typical example would be moving the 
print function higher up and making it into a module that other modules can 
use in defined ways.86 In the realm of contracts, the definition sections can 
emerge from such a process. Closely related definitions (implicit or explicit) 
of a given term buried in substantive provisions can be factored out and 
placed with the definitions in their own module. 
6. Porting 
Modules can be borrowed from one system and plugged into another. As 
long as the connections between the module and the exterior world (the rest 
of the system, especially the contract and the business context) are few and 
standardized, this process of porting will not cause disruptions. Porting is 
one of the chief virtues of boilerplate and what allows it to become the sub-
ject of a valuable body of judicial interpretations. Form books and treatises 
only make sense with a high degree of portability. Indeed the complaint of 
lawyers is that they imply a greater than optimal degree of portability.87 
At this point one might ask whether things could be otherwise. Is the 
current degree of modularity the only way contracts and other aspects of 
                                                                                                                      
 84. One of the central issues in contract theory has been over whether courts are in a position 
to create detailed default rules that would be sensitive to features of the parties such as their infor-
mation, the risks they can bear, and who is the cheapest cost avoider in various business contexts. 
Compare Alan Schwartz, The Default Rule Paradigm and the Limits of Contract Law, 3 S. Cal. 
Interdisc. L.J. 389 (1993), with Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and 
the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 Yale L.J. 729 (1992). 
 85. Baldwin & Clark, supra note 5, at 138–40. 
 86. Id. at 138.  
 87. For advice on how to pay attention to the ramifications of boilerplate, see Stark, supra 
note 59, at 5. 
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legal relations could be organized? The answer is no. First of all, as we will 
see, some of the traditional aspects of the law coming under the headings of 
formalism and conceptualism had the effect of making law more modular. 
Moving away from them has decreased modularity, at the cost of added 
complexity. When moving in this direction, the lessons from well-
understood areas like computer design and programming can point to over-
looked costs of the highly context-dependent style of legal reasoning so 
favored by the realists and their successors.88 
Another way to understand modularity is to examine superficially simi-
lar artifacts produced by very different processes and institutions. In this 
Article I am concerned mostly with contracts—and their contrast with prop-
erty. Contract drafting has something in common with legislation, and many 
of the features of modularity apply to legislative drafting as well. Tips on 
legislative drafting include the use of modular techniques.89 In both contracts 
and statutes, cross-references are a type of interaction that defeat modular-
ity, increase complexity, and create traps.90 For example, the drafters of the 
new Texas Business Organizations Code,91 effective on January 1, 2006, 
made a conscious effort to introduce a “hub and spoke” model that would 
set out provisions common to all business organizations separately (for ex-
ample, general definitions and provisions about mergers) and avoid 
duplication (Title 1), with specific titles for corporations, partnerships, et 
cetera.92 One of the members of the drafting committee set out how lessons 
from object-oriented analysis and design could inform exercises like this in 
legislative drafting. Although he does not use the term modularity, it is im-
plicit in many of the lessons he draws.93 
This advice presupposes one-time drafting with a comprehensive view 
that allows a conscious modularization in the first place. But not all legisla-
tion is like this. Consider the Internal Revenue Code, which is often cited as 
                                                                                                                      
 88. Take one example: 
As Justice Brennan candidly admitted in Penn Central . . . whether or not a government action 
is a taking “depends largely ‘upon the particular circumstances [in that] case.’” The Court must 
engage in “essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.” 
But is anything wrong with “essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries?” That is simply one way of 
expressing a pragmatic approach to decision making. Pragmatism is essentially particularist, 
essentially context-bound and holistic; each decision is an all-things-considered intuitive 
weighing. 
Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of 
Takings, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1667, 1680 (1988) (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 
438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted)). 
 89. Thomas F. Blackwell, Finally Adding Method to Madness: Applying Principles of Ob-
ject-Oriented Analysis and Design to Legislative Drafting, 3 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 227 
(1999–2000). 
 90. See, e.g., Scott A. Baxter, Reference Statutes: Traps for the Unwary, 30 McGeorge L. 
Rev. 562 (1999). 
 91. Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code Ann. (Vernon 2006). 
 92. Blackwell, supra note 89, at 249–57. 
 93. Id. at 268–88. 
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the ultimate example of a complex law. One of the features that makes it com-
plex is the large number of cross-references from one section to another, the 
cognitive costs of which were colorfully described by Judge Learned Hand: 
In my own case the words of such an act as the Income Tax, for example, 
merely dance before my eyes in a meaningless procession: cross-reference 
to cross-reference, exception upon exception—couched in abstract terms 
that offer no handle to seize hold of—leave in my mind only a confused 
sense of some vitally important, but successfully concealed, purport, which 
it is my duty to extract, but which is within my power, if at all, only after 
the most inordinate expenditure of time. I know that these monsters are the 
result of fabulous industry and ingenuity, plugging up this hole and casting 
out that net, against all possible evasion; yet at times I cannot help recall-
ing a saying of William James about certain passages of Hegel: that they 
were no doubt written with a passion of rationality; but that one cannot 
help wondering whether to the reader they have any significance save that 
the words are strung together with syntactical correctness.94  
This is nonmodularity. Not only are there many cross-references, but the 
Internal Revenue Code does not make use of concepts that apply across dif-
ferent settings. Notoriously, the Code does not have a unified conception of 
ownership, to which other provisions could “call” in modular fashion.95 In-
stead ownership is defined explicitly or implicitly for a variety of purposes 
in particular parts of the Code.  
Why is the tax code not as modular as one could imagine? Two reasons 
go a long way towards explaining the relative lack of modularity here. First, 
unlike in some areas of the law, each part of the Code is subject to potential 
manipulation by parties and telling them the exact contours of what is al-
lowed can be an invitation to evade in hard-to-foresee ways. Ownership and 
control sometimes cut in favor of the taxpayer and sometimes against, and 
particularly in antiabuse provisions, lack of detail can be manipulated by 
taxpayers.96 Thus, formalism (including modularity) is less practicable in tax 
law than in other areas. Second and relatedly, the tax code is the subject of 
intense lobbying and continual fixes in response to taxpayer manipulation. 
This takes the form of changes that would be prohibited by a strong form of 
modularity. New forms of evasion or new provisions, such as those govern-
                                                                                                                      
 94. Learned Hand, Thomas Walter Swan, 57 Yale L.J. 167, 169 (1947). Seeing increasing 
complexity as a trend, Hand went on: 
Much of the law is now as difficult to fathom, and more and more of it is likely to be so; for 
there is little doubt that we are entering a period of increasingly detailed regulation, and it will 
be the duty of judges to thread the path—for path there is—through these fantastic labyrinths. 
Id. 
 95. Nöel B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, Taxation Without Realization: A “Revolu-
tionary” Approach to Ownership, 47 Tax L. Rev. 725, 727 (1992) (noting that the Code has no 
unified conception of ownership and arguing for extension of the approach behind section 1286 
rules for bonds with attached coupons to defining ownership under the Code generally). 
 96. Wayne M. Gazur, The Forgotten Link: “Control” in Section 482, 15 Nw. J. Int’l L. & 
Bus. 1, 11–14 (1994); see also David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
860 (1999) (discussing sources of complexity for anti-abuse rules as opposed to standards). 
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ing new financial instruments, call for very different conceptions of owner-
ship. Some simple one-size-fits-all version of ownership would be a sitting 
duck for taxpayers and lobbyists. 
The example of the tax code underlines the importance of the process by 
which a modular system will or will not evolve. There are powerful forces 
pushing in the direction of modularity. The human mind—and this includes 
those of judges and the creators of artifacts like contracts as well as their 
contracting partners, who need to be persuaded to reach an agreement—
finds modular structures much easier to deal with cognitively. Further, in 
any environment in which these forms are subject to selection pressure, 
modularity may have major advantages. In a wide variety of settings, modu-
lar structures possess an advantage in terms of evolvability. A module can be 
added, subtracted, altered, et cetera, in response to stress from outside the 
system, without causing the rest of the system to fail. That modularity is a 
way of allowing complex systems to be more adaptive is now central to bio-
logical models of evolution.97 Even modularization of the system itself can 
be favored in the evolution of evolvability. 
When modularization is planned rather than evolved, it is difficult to es-
tablish which version of a decomposition (or even degree of decomposition) 
of a problem is the right one. Moreover, those creating systems do not al-
ways have the right incentives to adopt the optimal degree of modularity. 
People writing a contract or those creating a property interest may not care 
enough about the wider system of legal relations and the audiences for 
rights who have no say in the creation of idiosyncrasies by the parties them-
selves. I turn to these incentive problems and the externalities they give rise 
to in the next Part. 
Before turning to a simple model of the role of modularity in defining 
legal relations, it is worthwhile to consider how the benefits and costs of 
modularity differ depending on the nature of the parties. Between sophis-
ticated parties, one might think that common knowledge would make 
modularity unnecessary. The more parties are familiar with and can trust 
each other, the less they have to worry about traps.98 Nonetheless, complex 
interaction is difficult to deal with even for the sophisticated—a point to 
which I return in the next Part. But for now consider relatively unsophisticated 
parties. While it is true that sometimes marginal consumers can discipline 
sellers into offering efficient terms to everyone, the conditions for this to hap-
pen may not hold.99 If not, doctrines like procedural unconscionability (and 
                                                                                                                      
 97. See sources cited supra note 15. 
 98. The possibility of strategic behavior may make any system vulnerable. A modular system 
might be more easily manipulated because it is easy for the opportunist to understand or it can be 
difficult to game because the system has been designed to resist such behavior (and modularity can 
make such defensive design easier for the architect to achieve). 
 99. See, e.g., Richard Hynes & Eric A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Consumer Fi-
nance, 4 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 168, 170–77 (2002); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect 
Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 
Va. L. Rev. 1387, 1401–29 (1983) (showing that, just as with price diversity where consumers 
prefer one price, the variety of contract terms can affect consumer search costs); Alan Schwartz & 
SMITH FINAL.DOC 2/17/2006 11:37 AM 
1202 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 104:1175 
 
reasonable expectations in insurance law) can give consumers some assur-
ance that they will not be out in the cold if they treat various contractual 
provisions as modular.100 The internal workings of a provision, particularly 
if it looks standard but actually is not, should be treated as if it is standard 
unless prominent notice is given.101 Prominent notice is a more expensive 
way to communicate—what I will call intensive in the following—and its 
benefits are subject to increasing marginal cost. (Putting the whole con-
tract in boldface doesn’t do much.)  
Likewise the doctrine of contra proferentem is usually justified on the 
basis that the drafter, often but not always the more sophisticated party, 
might otherwise have an incentive to leave strategic ambiguities.102 Under 
the contra proferentem rule, ambiguities are resolved in favor of the 
nondrafting party. The drafter is presumed to be the cheapest cost avoider. 
For present purposes it is worth pointing out that the contra proferentem rule 
means that the costs of complexity are brought home to the one putting the 
complexity there. Ambiguity is often the result of less-than-complete modu-
larization; to resolve the ambiguity one must resort to context—either of the 
rest of the contract or of the deal itself. The contra proferentem rule trun-
cates this type of interaction between a provision and its context and 
supplies the reading more favorable to the nondrafting party. This requires a 
minimal use of context by the judge and causes the drafting party to tend to 
avoid modularity-defeating, ambiguous provisions. The contra proferentem 
rule, however, should not be absolute. We want the drafting party to avoid 
ambiguity but not to try to eliminate every ambiguity—an unattainable, or at 
                                                                                                                      
Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Eco-
nomic Analysis, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 630, 646–48 (1979); Alan Schwartz, How Much Irrationality 
Does the Market Permit? (Am. Law & Econ. Ass’n Annual Meetings, Paper No. 29, 2005), avail-
able at http://law.bepress.com/alea/15th/art29). 
 100. Much of the cases and commentary view with suspicion a contracting process character-
ized by a “lack of a meaningful choice. . . . consider[ing] . . . all the circumstances surrounding the 
transaction, including [t]he manner in which the contract was entered, whether each party had a 
reasonable opportunity to understand the terms of the contract, and whether the important terms 
[were] hidden in a maze of fine print.” Schroeder v. Fageol Motors, Inc., 544 P.2d 20, 23 (Wash. 
1975) (quoting Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture, 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (internal 
quotations omitted) (second and third alterations in original)); see Robert A. Hillman, The Rich-
ness of Contract Law: An Analysis and Critique of Contemporary Theories of Contract 
Law 138 (1997); Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the 
Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 429 (2002). The information-cost theory suggests sharpening the 
issue to whether market conditions permit a seller to push nonmodularity well beyond the optimal 
point. An obvious case would be one in which a consumer contract was much less modular than a 
similar contract between sophisticated parties. Putting this idea into practice would not be easy but 
might weed out obvious cases of abuse. On the doctrine of reasonable expectations, see, for exam-
ple, Kenneth S. Abraham, Distributing Risk: Insurance, Legal Theory, and Public Policy 
(1986), and Hillman & Rachlinski, supra, at 459–60. Again, if the doctrine allows consumers not to 
read but to rely on the presence of only reasonable boilerplate, the reasonableness of the boilerplate 
should turn in part on the degree of modularization. 
 101. This familiar notice-giving strategy is particularly favored in contexts that straddle the 
contract-property divide in that the dutyholders are either numerous or indefinite. See Merrill & 
Smith, supra note 33, at 803–09. 
 102. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory of Insurance Policy Interpretation, 95 Mich. L. 
Rev. 531 (1996); Posner, supra note 58, at 37. 
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least not cost-effective, ideal.103 Nor, without more, is it obvious that the 
drafting party should be an unlimited insurer for all remaining ambiguity no 
matter how unforeseeable and unsusceptible to manipulation. As with the 
plain-meaning rule and prohibitions on extrinsic evidence, the point is that 
normatively the law should favor an approach that pushes drafting parties in 
the direction of minimizing—not eliminating—information costs to 
nondrafting parties, particularly unsophisticated ones. 
II. A Model of Modularity in Contract Boilerplate 
In this Part, I present a model of modularity in contractual boilerplate 
which captures how boilerplate is intermediate between contract and prop-
erty. Once we apply the tools of information theory, we can show that 
context-dependence and its converse, formality, are matters of degree. If so, 
this calls into question the assumption in the traditional debate between real-
ism and formalism that context-independence would have to be potentially 
total for formalism to make sense. Modularity, like other devices, pushes 
legal relations away from context-dependence and towards formality, but the 
real questions are what degree of modularity is optimal in various contexts 
and who has an incentive to bring the degree of modularity in a contract or 
other written instrument towards this optimal point. 
A. Formalism and Context-Dependence 
Before turning to a theory of optimal modularity, consider context-
dependence and formality. The legal realists took the formalists of the late-
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries to be arguing that language could 
be perfectly independent of context and that law could partly for that reason 
be an autonomous discipline, “legal science.”104 Many realists believed that 
once they could show that interpreters relied on context even a little, that 
formalism was dead.105 And the formalists, not being big on theory, had little 
to counter with. 
But formalism is a matter of degree, and this is fatal to the classic hyper-
realist argument. For our purposes, a very useful definition of formalism is 
that offered by Francis Heylighen: formalism is the degree of invariance to 
context.106 Thus, mathematical notation is very formal because each state-
ment is expressed in a system with a precise syntax and semantics that allows 
interpretation to be largely, although not completely, context-dependent. Well-
known results point to the fact that ultimately some element of interpretation 
                                                                                                                      
 103. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 58; Smith, supra note 1. 
 104. See, e.g., Paul N. Cox, An Interpretation and (Partial) Defense of Legal Formalism, 36 
Ind. L. Rev. 57, 59–68 (2003) (discussing formalism as autonomous conceptualism as among varie-
ties of formalism opposed by realists and their successors); Brian Leiter, Positivism, Formalism, 
Realism, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1138, 1144–49 (1999) (book review); Smith, supra note 1, at 1177–83.  
 105. Smith, supra note 1, at 1180–81. 
 106. See Francis Heylighen, Advantages and Limitations of Formal Expression, 4 Found. Sci. 
25, 49–53 (1999). 
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will have to come from outside the system, but in mathematics this element is 
at its minimum (which is not zero).107 In their everyday work, mathematicians 
tend to use a somewhat less formal system that requires more contextual 
knowledge. Natural language comes in varieties that are more or less for-
mal. For example, words like pronouns and demonstratives depend on 
context and contribute to a lesser degree of formality. This has led some 
linguists to propose an index of formalism in natural language and to use it 
in statistical analysis of natural language corpora.108 
The repetition of noun phrases in contracts (for example, the party of the 
first part commits that the party of the first part will . . .) is an example—
some would say an unfortunate example—of formalism.109 But notice that 
use of pronouns instead of full noun phrases increases the reliance on con-
text and causes interactions of the type that are inconsistent with stricter 
forms of modularity. Tracing out all the possible interpretations of a passage 
with many pronouns can be very complex: there are many phrases requiring 
the assignment of an interpretation and the interpretations can interact in 
ways that are sometimes hard to foresee.110 
Context-dependence and formalism have costs and benefits that are mir-
ror images of each other. It is simply not the case that we always want 
maximum or minimum context-dependence (minimum or maximum formal-
ism). Context-dependence allows messages to be short given the amount of 
information conveyed. Where those communicating share a lot of back-
ground knowledge, lack of formalism does not lead to misunderstanding 
because the parties can converge on an interpretation using their background 
knowledge. This sort of thing happens in everyday conversation in ways that 
are sophisticated but easy to ignore.  
In everyday conversation a great deal of information can be packed into 
few words because both parties can rely on what Grice called the Coopera-
tive Principle: “[m]ake your conversational contribution such as is required, 
at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the 
                                                                                                                      
 107. Id. at 34–38 (discussing nature of definitions, primitive terms, and “intrinsic limitations 
principles” such as Gödel’s incompleteness theorem). 
 108. See, e.g., Jean-Marc Dewaele, How to Measure Formality of Speech? A Model of Syn-
chronic Variation, in Approaches to Second Language Acquisition 119 (Kari Sajavaara & 
Courtney Fairweather eds., 1996); see also Jean-Marc Dewaele, Style-Shifting in Oral Interlan-
guage: Quantification and Definition, in The Current State of Interlanguage 233 (Lynn 
Eubank, Larry Selinker & Michael Sharwood Smith eds., 1995); Heylighen, supra note 106, at 49–
53. 
 109. See Peter M. Tiersma, Legal Language 71–73 (1999). The use of noun phrases in-
stead of pronouns is a familiar aspect of context-dependence (called indexicality) and features in 
Dewaele’s constructed variable of formalism. See sources cited supra note 108. 
 110. Pronoun reference is one of the most studied topics among generative grammarians. See, 
e.g., Gennaro Chierchia & Sally McConnell-Ginet, Meaning and Grammar: An Intro-
duction to Semantics 330–33 (2d ed. 2000); Richard Montague, Formal Philosophy: 
Selected Papers of Richard Montague (Richmond H. Thomason ed., 1974); Yehoshua Bar-
Hillel, Indexical Expressions, 63 Mind 359 (1954). 
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talk exchange in which you are engaged.”111 Because of this general princi-
ple and the background knowledge shared by the parties to a conversation, 
much can be communicated via conversational implicature.112 For example, 
people usually say something like “It’s cold” in order to get someone stand-
ing near an open window to close it, rather than something like “I hereby 
request that you, being closer to the window than I, please close the win-
dow.” The latter version would be more effective when dealing with 
someone who has never seen a window before. The second version is more 
formal because it can work in a wider variety of contexts, but it comes at the 
greater cost of more length and greater planning (not to mention greater syn-
tactic complexity). The ability to lower the cost of the message itself by 
using conversational implicature and context (including audiences’ back-
ground knowledge), versus the sacrifice of portability across those contexts, 
is an example of what I have termed the informational trade-off: everyday 
conversation is informationally dense (what I am calling “intensive”) in that 
it compacts a lot of information per unit of communicative effort.113 When 
we want the message to reach a wider audience and more types of contexts, 
we have to engage in more (not complete) formalism by using messages that 
are costlier to create and to process. 
Notice that conversational implicature’s reliance on context not only 
makes conversational interpretation—usually called pragmatics by lin-
guists—relatively informal, it also makes pragmatics nonmodular.114 
Modularity, like formalism in general, is inconsistent with heavy reliance on 
context. Although it goes well beyond the subject of this Article, it is 
worthwhile to note that many aspects of natural-language competence, in-
cluding syntax and even semantics, have been profitably studied by 
assuming that each of these subareas and components of them are imple-
mented in the mind/brain by modules. Pragmatics is not one of them. 
Grice’s Cooperative Principle looms large in pragmatics and should sound 
familiar to economists: it is the rational-actor paradigm in the realm of con-
versation.115 Instead, the assumption in pragmatics is that general cognitive 
abilities come into play, and pragmatics either does not emphasize cognitive 
limits (as in Grice) or focuses on limits on general, not modular cognition. 
                                                                                                                      
 111. H.P. Grice, Logic and Conversation, in 3 Syntax and Semantics 41, 45 (Peter Cole & 
Jerry L. Morgan eds., 1975), reprinted in Paul Grice, Studies in the Ways of Words 22, 26 
(1989). 
 112. Grice, supra note 111, at 30; see also Stephen C. Levinson, Presumptive Meanings: 
The Theory of Generalized Conversational Implicature (2000) (recent development of 
Gricean theory). 
 113. Smith, supra note 1, at 1110–11, 1126–33. 
 114. See generally Stephen C. Levinson, Pragmatics (1983); Dan Sperber & Deirdre 
Wilson, Relevance: Communication and Cognition (1986). 
 115. See Jay David Atlas & Stephen C. Levinson, It-Clefts, Informativeness, and Logical 
Form: Radical Pragmatics (Revised Standard Version), in Radical Pragmatics 1 (Peter Cole ed., 
1981); Richard Craswell, Do Trade Customs Exist?, in The Jurisprudential Foundations of 
Corporate and Commercial Law 132 (Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt eds., 2000); H. Paul 
Grice, Further Notes on Logic and Conversation, in 9 Syntax and Semantics 113 (Peter Cole ed., 
1978), reprinted in Grice, supra note 111, at 41.  
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By contrast, modular aspects of mind, like language competence (and vi-
sion, et cetera), are easier to study precisely because of their modularity and 
the constraints that imposes.116 If central processes (as opposed to modular 
ones like perception and language with specific neural structures) approach 
universal connectivity, interesting patterns emerge because of the outer envi-
ronment and not from the constraints imposed by internal mental 
modularity. I would like to suggest something similar for law and econom-
ics. The more modular an artifact is, the easier it is to study, and the more a 
decisionmaking process is modular and leads to modular artifacts, the more 
amenable it is to the tools of analysis that are available both to economists 
and cognitive scientists. I suggest that the reason that law and economics 
has been especially successful in the study of the common law, as opposed 
to legislation and constitutions,117 is that common law judges proceeding 
case-by-case have fashioned modular principles that are easier to analyze 
than the typical outputs of legislative or administrative bodies. 
What happens when stakes are high? Parties can invest in developing 
background knowledge and trust or they can invest in more formalism in the 
written agreements that govern their relationship. But where parties do not 
share much background and cannot develop it cost-effectively, formalism 
may increase the cost of the message but reduce error costs. Where people 
do not share much background knowledge or have interests antagonistic to 
each other, it becomes worthwhile to invest in greater formality in order to 
avoid the high error costs. High stakes thus do not unambiguously point in 
either direction if we take a very ex ante perspective. However, if we take 
the level of background knowledge as given, then an increase in the stakes 
as between these parties suggests an increase in formalism. And high-stakes 
deals are associated with more formal agreements in this relativized sense. 
The choice of a degree of formalism is subject to what I have called 
elsewhere the informational trade-off. Intensive communication involves a 
lot of information per unit of communicative effort. But increasing the 
intensiveness of communication will require either incurring more com-
munication costs or reducing the extensiveness of the audience and the 
ability to draw on context in general. At a given cost there is a trade-off 
between intensiveness and extensiveness of communication. Property is 
more formal (less context-dependent), and, being in rem, is meant to reach 
a larger audience. In general, property interests can be mixed and matched 
and used in a wide variety of contexts. They are very portable in a way 
that they would not be if they were tailored to individual situations.118 Cer-
tain features of a fee simple of a lease hold true regardless of the nature of 
the asset and the holder of the interest. This makes property rights very 
                                                                                                                      
 116. See Fodor, supra note 14, at 101–19. 
 117. A prominent example of nonmodular legislation is the tax code. See supra notes 94–96 
and accompanying text. 
 118. The types of property rights are limited to a fixed and finite number under the numerus 
clausus, and the ones allowed first should be the most widely useful. Merrill & Smith, supra note 3, 
at 39. 
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easy to decipher. It also makes furnishing notice to purchasers and poten-
tial violators much cheaper. 
Modularity is one method of reducing dependence on context. A modu-
lar provision in a contract or a modular property right can be added, 
subtracted, transported, et cetera, into new contexts. And the removal or 
change of a module does not cause problems, because the module interacts 
relatively little with the context. As long as the interface conditions are 
obeyed, one need not worry further about the context. For example, if a 
choice of law boilerplate provision is modified or replaced, one need not 
hunt through a contract to find all the hidden connections that might lead to 
difficult-to-foresee problems. Some attention needs to be paid to such poten-
tial problems because formalism (invariance to context) is not and cannot be 
complete, but a less modular provision would require a great deal more re-
vising of a holistic sort and would greatly increase reading costs to the other 
party. 
B. An Information-Theoretic Model of Boilerplate 
We can capture this trade-off and begin to explain the nature of boiler-
plate and the costs of reading it by extending a simple isocost model of 
information costs. Information is measured by bits in information theory; 
each bit can eliminate up to half of a set of possibilities.119 The more im-
probable a message is, the more bits are required to capture it. Elsewhere I 
have defined intensiveness of communication as the information rate—
information per unit of delineation cost.120 Likewise, we will be concerned 
with how far a communication can travel. We can construct an index of 
compatibility to context (extensiveness) by taking the number of contexts in 
which the message must function, each context weighted by the probability 
of its occurrence.121  
Holding the costs of producing and receiving a message about legal rela-
tions constant, one must trade off the intensiveness of the communication with 
the extensiveness of the set of contexts into which the communication can fit. 
On the intensive side, a message can have a high information rate and heavy 
reliance on (specialized) contexts. Think of a highly idiosyncratic contract 
term. Or, on the extensive side, one can make the message easier to fit into a 
wider range of contexts but will have to lower the information rate: spelling 
things out will cause the rate of information per unit of communication cost to 
                                                                                                                      
 119. See C.E. Shannon, The Mathematical Theory of Communication (Part 1), 27 Bell Sys. 
Tech. J. 379 (1948), reprinted in Claude E. Shannon & Warren Weaver, The Mathematical 
Theory of Communication 3 (1949); C.E. Shannon, The Mathematical Theory of Communication 
(Part 2), 27 Bell Sys. Tech. J. 623 (1948), reprinted in Shannon & Weaver, supra, at 3; see also 
Keith Devlin, Logic and Information 3–26 (1991) (adapting information theory to individual 
messages); Fred I. Dretske, Knowledge and the Flow of Information 142 (1981); R.V.L. 
Hartley, Transmission of Information, 7 Bell Sys. Tech. J. 535 (1928) (developing notion of 
“amount of information”). 
 120. Smith, supra note 1, at 1109–11, 1126–33. 
 121. Id. at 1111–13, 1133–39. Here I take context to be defined by economically important 
features of the environment, not just audience characteristics. 
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go down. All else equal, increased extensiveness requires decreased inten-
siveness. This can be modeled by an isocost reflecting a budget to be 
allocated between average information rate (intensiveness) and the compati-
bility with context (extensiveness). Points along the line connecting the two 
axes in Figure 5 all represent different combinations of information rate and 
wideness of context that are equally costly. Additional isocost lines to the 
northeast in the Figure, not drawn here, would involve a greater level of 
cost. In Figure 5, this is illustrated with information rate (r) on the y-axis 
and (weighted) number of reachable contexts (n) on the x-axis.122 
Figure 5 













n = audience size 
r = information rate 
C = isobenefit for contract 
B = isobenefit for contractual boilerplate 
P = isobenefit for property 
Communication costs should be incurred as long as marginal communi-
cation cost is smaller than marginal communication benefit, but the model 
here emphasizes how costs should be allocated between trying to compact 
information (intensiveness) or reach a wide set of contexts (extensiveness). 
For the same cost, one can communicate at a high information rate in spe-
cialized contexts (high r, low n), or at a low information rate in a large set of 
contexts (low r, high n).  
On the benefits side, different combinations of intensiveness and exten-
siveness have different values depending on one’s goals. Otherwise, a single 
mode of legal communication with a single level of formalism would be 
appropriate in all instances. But this is not so. Consider first the contrast of 
                                                                                                                      
 122. To avoid asymptotic isocost lines, the origin depicts the minimal unit of information 
being communicated to one person.  
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contract and property. In the case of contracts, particularly those involving 
sophisticated parties, there are large benefits to be gained from error-free 
communication with one or a few parties—the parties to the contract and 
perhaps a third-party beneficiary. To some extent judges have to be commu-
nicated to as well.123 This is illustrated by isobenefit curve C (mnemonic for 
contract) and those parallel to it.124 Where someone is claiming a property 
right, things are very different. Here one is interested in having the message 
travel widely, but not much information is needed in order to secure the 
benefits of property: a message to keep off works to protect investments 
against all but a few interested parties. Moreover, there are advantages to 
being able to transfer and compare these rights with similar ones used by 
other people. This is illustrated by the isobenefit curve P (mnemonic for 
property) and those parallel to it.125  
Now consider boilerplate. Like other contractual provisions, it is most 
useful to the contracting parties. But it deals with matters that could be 
walled off and dealt with in a modular way. As far as context-dependence 
within a contract, the benefits of high context-dependence are less than in 
other matters. Also, it is useful to be able to take a boilerplate term and re-
use it, in which case context-dependence is not as beneficial as it might 
otherwise be. The isobenefit curves for boilerplate, denoted B (mnemonic 
for boilerplate), are in between those for contract and property. Their inter-
mediate location reflects the fact that boilerplate needs to reach an 
intermediately sized set of contexts (audiences, contracts, business settings). 
Different types of boilerplate will be located at different intermediate points 
and the diagram is only meant to depict its intermediate status. 
We can now derive the optimal mix of intensiveness and extensiveness. 
In each case we want to find the mix at the point where the isocost curve is 
tangent to the highest isobenefit curve it can reach in each of the three situa-
tions. In the first, core contract-like case, the curve C is tangent to the 
isocost at point (nc*, rc*), which means that the right will be characterized 
by intensive information directed at few people. In the case of curve P, the 
tangency point is at (np*, rp*) and the right will be characterized by less in-
tensive but more extensive information. And in the case of boilerplate the 
isobenefit curve is tangent at point (nb*, rb*), which falls between (nc*, rc*) 
and (np*, rp*). Boilerplate is somewhere on the road from contract to prop-
erty. Being part of a contract, boilerplate may not be far along this road, but 
                                                                                                                      
 123. In contract theory, this comes under the heading of verification costs, which, despite 
typical assumptions of contract theory, fall on a sliding scale. See George G. Triantis, The Efficiency 
of Vague Contract Terms: A Response to the Schwartz-Scott Theory of U.C.C. Article 2, 62 La. L. 
Rev. 1065 (2002). 
 124. Contracts between a few sophisticated and numerous unsophisticated parties might be 
somewhat closer to the curves for property than are contracts between a small number of identified 
and fully informed parties. For factors that make some contractual situations somewhat “intermedi-
ate” between prototypical contract and property, see Merrill & Smith, supra note 33, at 799–809, 
and Smith, supra note 1, at 1151–53. 
 125. All the curves are concave because information rate and information extensiveness are 
not perfect substitutes: one has to give up more and more of one input to achieve the same amount 
of benefit with substitution of the other input.  
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among contractual provisions boilerplate is more property-like than others 
in terms of the informational trade-off. 
This model does allow us to derive a prediction about the relative sizes 
of the externality in the three situations. As I have argued elsewhere, exter-
nalities emerge on the extensive margin.126 Those doing the communicating 
will worry most about those they deal with, but potential audiences that are 
more distant—especially those not in privity with the communicator—will 
incur processing costs not brought home to the communicator. This is the 
basic reason why property, directed as it is at the widest audience, is most 
subject to informational externalities and is the most appropriate area for a 
mandatory rule like the numerus clausus that keeps the information rate 
down to manageable levels for remote audiences.127 But extensiveness can 
be extended to other aspects of the context for legal communication. Com-
municators will care about how a provision or other message fits into the 
contexts (the contract and the deal of which it is a part) at hand but will care 
less about other contexts. In the case of contracts this problem is small. Al-
though it is true that there are network externalities from using standardized 
forms, contracts also need to be tailored to the parties’ needs.128 Moreover, 
future dealings with the other party will make more contexts relevant to both 
parties.  
Boilerplate is once again intermediate. If one used a more tailored provi-
sion rather than modular boilerplate, one may burden the other party, and 
the other party will find such a term harder to process and to accept. If so, 
there will be some tendency to adopt modular boilerplate in order to assure 
the other party.129 The more standardized boilerplate is, the more it can serve 
this function, but no one party may reap enough of the benefits of standardi-
zation to invest heavily in such terms.130 However, law firms will have their 
own boilerplate—which can serve as some assurance of not causing interac-
tions and traps for oneself. The use of boilerplate thus lowers legal costs, in 
part because it is simple and in part because this simplicity through modu-
larity allows its reuse. Although this often makes boilerplate a public good, 
trade associations sometimes propose boilerplate,131 and parties with particu-
larly high stakes will sometimes have more than enough incentive to provide 
the optimal amount of boilerplate.132 Thus, it is an empirical question 
                                                                                                                      
 126. Smith, supra note 1, at 1139–48, 1153–57. 
 127. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 3, at 24–42; Smith, supra note 1, at 1157–62. 
 128. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contract-
ing: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior, and Cognitive Biases, 74 Wash. U. L.Q. 347 (1996); 
Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or 
“The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 Va. L. Rev. 713 (1997); Michael Klausner, Corporations, 
Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 Va. L. Rev. 757 (1995). 
 129. See infra notes 136–141 and accompanying text. 
 130. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 128. 
 131. See Kevin E. Davis, The Role of Nonprofits in the Production of Boilerplate, 104 Mich. 
L. Rev. 1075 (2006). 
 132. See David D. Haddock, Why Individuals Provide Public Goods (draft November 2005) 
(on file with Michigan Law Review). 
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whether lock-in will happen, even in the face of large changes in the context 
that call for some remodularization.133 While it is true that under certain as-
sumptions about information these terms could be overreaching, the model 
here predicts that they will still be more modular than they would be in a 
world where trade associations were solely interested in putting one over on 
customers. 
Figure 6 derives the relative sizes of the externalities, assuming that it 
increases with the number of contexts that are supposed to be reached. 
Number of contexts and externality go hand in hand. To a communicator, 
the costs of reaching some of these contexts will appear to be less than it is, 
making the isocost line as it appears to the communicator, line LM, less 
steep than the actual line LL, which is the “full” isocost line that reflects all 
the costs of the communication:  
Figure 6 
















nc* nc' np* np'
 
n = audience size 
r = information rate 
C1, C2, C3 = isobenefit curves for contract 
B1, B2, B3 = isobenefit curves for contractual boilerplate 
P1, P2, P3 = isobenefit curves for property 
The communicator’s choice is skewed towards excessive context-
dependence, and the problem is greatest in property and least in contract. 
Boilerplate is in between. The externality will increase with the excess of 
                                                                                                                      
 133. For arguments that network effects give rise to lock-in, see sources cited supra note 128. 
For more cautious and skeptical views, see, for example, Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, 
Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 Cal L. Rev. 479, 562–91 (1998) (analyzing 
network effects in corporate and contract law and concluding that systematically suboptimal con-
tracting has not been established, and S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, The Fable of the Keys, 
33 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1990) (arguing for rarity of strong path-dependence and questioning canonical 
example). 
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the extensiveness chosen over the optimal level (generically, n’-n*). Con-
sider the contractual situation. That benchmark point is at nc* where the full-
cost line LL is tangent with the isobenefit curve C2, which is the highest 
level of (net social) benefit attainable with this budget. Similarly for nb* and 
np*, for boilerplate and property, respectively. In each case (of contract, boi-
lerplate, and property), the communicator will believe himself to be facing 
the less steep budget line. This means that the communicator will believe 
that he can attain a higher level of benefit than is socially optimal.134 As the 
degree of extensiveness called for by the situation increases, the gap be-
tween the full and apparent budget line becomes larger; more contexts 
means proportionally more contexts whose costs are not brought home to 
the communicator. In the case of contractual provisions, this externality is 
smaller than in the case of boilerplate which is in turn smaller than in the 
case of property: nc’-nc* < nb’-nb* < np’-np*. 
If property, and to a lesser extent boilerplate, should be kept simple for 
these reasons, this is somewhat counterintuitive because generally with 
more at stake, we would expect more complexity to be worth incurring. But 
higher stakes can lead to efforts at greater modularization. In particular, 
where modularization has greater benefits, in boilerplate and even more so 
in property, we might expect private parties and public authorities to expend 
efforts on keeping things simple and standardized. Particularly if the kind of 
processing costs here are basic to human cognition, the fact that judges or 
other interpreters will themselves need to process legal communication will 
have a tendency to lead parties to keep things simple and for the third-party 
decisionmakers themselves to favor or even mandate simplicity.135  
This model also allows a new explanation of contract “reading costs” 
and can be used to ground models based on such costs. The externality here 
is one of reading costs. Most economic models of costly contracting assume 
that the main cost preventing ideal, complete contracts is that information 
cannot be verified (to a third party) or that spelling out contingencies is sim-
ply not worth the (sometimes low) cost.136 If a contingency is remote and not 
too disastrous, it is not worth even incurring small drafting costs. In addi-
tion, parties who insist on going into this detail may be taken by their 
negotiating partners to be untrustworthy.137 In other words, from a commu-
                                                                                                                      
 134. There is another way to derive the externality, as discussed in Smith, supra note 1, at 
1154 n.174. By selecting along line LM when from a social point of view one cannot do better than 
LL, the private actor is in effect selecting along a budget line KL. This is the actual trade-off being 
made along LM taking social cost into account: KL shares a point with LL on the x-axis but is paral-
lel to line LM. When the private actor believes he is at point M, he is really at point L on the x-axis. 
The actor nonideally trades off r and n at the rate reflected in line LM (and parallel line KL), that is, 
at a rate of – OL / OM. Notice that KL is tangent to the lowest drawn isoquants for contract, boiler-
plate, and property (C1, B1, P1), again reflecting lower social benefits than in the case of C2, B2, and 
P2.  
 135. Smith, supra note 1, at 1155–60. 
 136. See, e.g., Eggleston et al., supra note 4, at 91–126; Jean Tirole, Incomplete Contracts: 
Where Do We Stand?, 67 Econometrica 741 (1999).  
 137. See, e.g., Eggleston et al., supra note 4, at 117–19. 
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nicative point of view, the emphasis has been on contracting costs from the 
supply side—those faced by the communicator.  
One exception to this supply-side approach is Eric Rasmusen’s model of 
contracting based on reading costs.138 On this model, if two parties are con-
tracting, the nondrafting party (of any given provision) must read the 
contract, but finding potential traps is costly and will be more costly the 
longer the contract is. For Rasmusen, length is a proxy for complexity be-
cause on his model, “a complex contract is a contract with one extra clause 
added.”139 For the drafter, assuring the other party that there are no traps is 
also costly. Knowing this, the party drafting will draft a shorter (incomplete) 
contract in order to give this assurance at lower cost. By using a short con-
tract, the reading party can enter into the contract without worrying about 
traps or spending a lot of time and effort checking to make sure that they are 
not there. 
One potential objection to this theory is that one may doubt that reading 
costs are so high. Why should long contracts be so costly to read? A few 
extra pages can be read fairly quickly and lawyers are experts at looking for 
provisions that do not suit their clients, especially if the problem is the addi-
tion or not of a given clause. At least as between sophisticated parties, 
contract length seems hard to derive from the costs of reading. 
Once we move away from identifying complexity with length, reading 
costs are easier to understand as an obstacle to complete contracting. Com-
plex contracts, those containing many parts with relatively many 
interactions, are difficult to process. Modularizing the contract can help but 
may require omitting some interactions that would tailor the contract to dis-
tinguish between situations. For example, one could imagine a choice of law 
provision making reference to different problems that could arise under 
other provisions of the contract and prescribing a different choice depending 
on which provision is in question (which might carry with it some advan-
tages where the contract is supposed to be performed in multiple locations). 
If, to avoid complexity from such interaction, a single jurisdiction’s law is 
selected, incompleteness is chosen to manage complexity. This may typi-
cally result in a shorter boilerplate provision, but not necessarily.140  
The costs of reading can help explain the modularity of contacts, but the 
information-cost theory here allows us to be more specific about the nature 
of reading costs. It is well-known among practitioners dealing with contracts 
that boilerplate can be readily identified and mentally segregated, which is 
possible because of its relatively stereotyped interaction with the operative 
                                                                                                                      
 138. Eric Bennett Rasmusen, Explaining Incomplete Contracts as the Result of Contract-
Reading Costs, Advances Econ. Analysis & Pol’y, 2001, available at http://www.bepress.com/ 
bejeap/advances/vol1/iss1/art2/index.html (follow “View the Article” hyperlink). 
 139. Id. at *31. 
 140. It is true that one information-theoretic approach to complexity is to measure it by the 
length of the shortest description in an agreed-upon language. The language and style that contracts 
are written in give no assurance of satisfying the conditions for applying this algorithmic or descrip-
tional complexity (also known as Kolmogorov complexity). Ming Li & Paul Vitányi, An 
Introduction to Kolmogorov Complexity and Its Applications (2d ed. 1997).  
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provisions of the contract.141 More generally, modularity is a method of deal-
ing with complexity—the type of complexity faced by one reading a 
contract. Modularity can be regarded as making contracts simpler; with 
fewer potential interactions to trace out, it is easier to convince a negotiating 
party that there are no traps. Interactions make contracts more complex and 
potentially harbor traps. Thus, a model like Rasmusen’s should predict that 
contracts should be more modular, but not necessarily shorter, than they 
would in a hypothetical world of zero reading costs. 
III. Further Applications 
The advantages of modularity help explain some major features of boi-
lerplate and their function. Boilerplate is more encapsulated and tends to 
avoid interaction with substantive terms of the contract. This makes boiler-
plate more portable and revisable, and makes assurance to the nondrafting 
party easier to furnish. In these ways, boilerplate reduces reading costs, a 
type of processing cost. The very notion of reading costs can be linked up to 
well-known limits on human cognition, limits that find their expression in 
other human artifacts, from computer programs to business organizations. In 
this Part, I will provide further, indirect evidence of the importance of 
modularity in boilerplate and in the process of contracting more generally.  
A. Nonmodularity in Legal Realism 
The legal realists were antiformalists, and I have already had occasion to 
mention their advocacy of context-dependence—the opposite of formal-
ism—in the interpretation of contacts.142 Realists have been especially harsh 
in their attacks on the four-corners rule, under which an integrated agree-
ment is to be interpreted without extrinsic evidence, and the parol evidence 
rule, under which parol evidence is inadmissible unless a contract is am-
biguous.143 From the early-twentieth century, contract doctrine to some 
extent trended away from formalism and towards an increasing openness to 
evidence of the contractual setting.144 More recently, courts and commentary 
                                                                                                                      
 141. Scott Burnham advises reading a contract in several passes, the second of which involves 
identifying the boilerplate declarations and focusing on the rights and duties of the parties, espe-
cially how they are conditioned on the happening of some event. On the theory presented here this 
makes sense: identifying and mentally segregating boilerplate occurs at the same stage that one 
starts worrying about interdependencies. Scott J. Burnham, How To Read a Contract, 45 Ariz. L. 
Rev. 133, 138, 144–45, 147 (2003). 
 142. See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text. 
 143. See Smith, supra note 1, at 1177–90. 
 144. See Smith, supra note 1, at 1182–83. A turning point in this history of the parol evidence 
rule is Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 
1968), in which the California Supreme Court allowed extrinsic evidence to be introduced on the 
question of whether a contract was ambiguous. In typical realist fashion, Chief Justice Traynor 
asserted that adherence to the traditional parol evidence rule would reflect “a judicial belief in the 
possibility of perfect verbal expression. . . . [a] belief [that] is a remnant of a primitive faith in the 
inherent potency and inherent meaning of words.” Id. at 643–44 (citation and footnote omitted). 
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have pulled back somewhat from the more contextualized approach that was 
the trend in the 1960s and 1970s.145 Whether this partial retrenchment re-
flects in part the complexity of the task that relatively nonmodular 
approaches to contract law placed on courts is beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle, but it is suggestive. Perhaps more telling is that the realists themselves 
had difficulty maintaining their context-sensitive approach in one area over 
which they had more direct control (and suffered the consequences of non-
modularity)—the writing of contracts casebooks. 
Contracts was one of the areas that realists saw as most in need of a 
move away from the (to them) illusory autonomous concepts like offer and 
agreement, and towards greater sensitivity to commercial, political, and 
social context. For example, Arthur Corbin begins his treatise with an ar-
gument that an open-textured term like “reasonable” calls for 
contextualized decisionmaking: 
It must not be supposed that contract problems have been solved by the 
dictum that expectations must be “reasonable.” Reasonableness is no more 
absolute in character than is justice or morality. Like them it is an expres-
sion of the customs and mores of men—the customs and mores that are 
themselves complex, variable with time and place, inconsistent and con-
tradictory. Nevertheless, the term is useful, giving direction to judicial 
research, and producing workable results. The reasonably prudent man, 
reasonable care and diligence, reasonable expectations, are terms that are 
not to be abandoned, at least until we can demonstrate that others will 
work better.146 
Felix Cohen, too, took the question “Is there a contract?” as the vehicle to 
attack traditional legal analysis for being insufficiently empirically oriented 
and not pragmatic enough, using anti-metaphysical and pragmatist rhetoric 
typical of the philosophy of the day.147 Realist lawyers are engaged in the 
positive task of predicting what judges will do, and realist judges are asked 
to decide based on social reality what the law should be. The charge against 
the conceptualists that they engaged in mystical thinking was a common one 
and carried over to their attitude toward language itself. Carrying forward 
this rationalist, realist hostility, Frederick Philbrick made a patronizing at-
tack on belief in the determinacy of language: 
                                                                                                                      
 145. Gary J. Aichele, Legal Realism and Twentieth-Century American Jurispru-
dence, at x (1990) (“Impossible only a decade ago, ‘mechanical jurisprudence’ has made a 
remarkable comeback, and a new legal formalism may yet triumph as the principal mode of [judi-
cial] interpretation . . . .”); David Charny, The New Formalism in Contract, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 842 
(1999); Ralph James Mooney, The New Conceptualism in Contract Law, 74 Or. L. Rev. 1131 
(1995); G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 431, 436 
(1993); Peter Nash Swisher, A Realistic Consensus Approach to the Insurance Law Doctrine of 
Reasonable Expectations, 35 Tort & Ins. L.J. 729 (2000). On textualism versus contextualism, see 
Goetz & Scott, supra note 83. 
 146. Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 1, at 2 (1 vol. ed. 1952). 
 147. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 Colum. L. 
Rev. 809, 839–42 (1935).  
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First we had better dispose of some superstitions. A primitive notion sur-
vives in many parts of the world—it is perhaps hardly rational enough to 
be called a belief—that the connection between a word and the thing it 
stands for is closer than the merely mental connection between symbol and 
object. Most primitive peoples imagine that the word not only stands for 
but in some sense is the thing.148 
The critique of the determinacy of language was central to the realists’ call 
for contextualized decisionmaking.149 
Interestingly, the realist who was least unsympathetic to the use of legal 
concepts, Karl Lllewellyn, took the appearance of boilerplate as a reason to 
enforce contracts according to contextualized expectation and not the lan-
guage itself: 
Instead of thinking about “assent” to boiler-plate clauses, we can recognize 
that so far as concerns the specific, there is no assent at all. What has in 
fact been assented to, specifically, are the few dickered terms, and the 
broad type of the transaction, and but one thing more. . . . a blanket assent 
(not a specific assent) to any not unreasonable or indecent terms the seller 
may have on his form, which do not alter or eviscerate the reasonable 
meaning of the dickered terms.150 
The need for modularity suggests the strengths and limits of this argu-
ment. In the consumer context, forcing drafters to be very clear if they want 
to override usual buyer expectations allows buyers to approach contracts as 
if they are modular. There is less need for the buyer to parse the language 
and look for interactions between the boilerplate term and the rest of the 
contract and the business context. However, where sufficient notice is given 
or where both parties are sophisticated enough, the use of boilerplate can 
harness the benefits of modularity by being interpreted without great atten-
tion to context—not only course of dealing and industry custom, but also the 
                                                                                                                      
 148. Frederick A. Philbrick, Language and the Law: The Semantics of Forensic 
English 27 (1949). 
 149. See also Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 
Harv. L. Rev. 630, 663 (1958) (arguing against Hart’s attempt to preserve a core of meaning in 
legal terms and contending that all interpretation of even the seemingly plainest words requires 
an inquiry into purpose). See generally Smith, supra note 1, at 1177–82 (discussing realism and 
formalism in contract interpretation). James Bradley Thayer, even prior to realism, made much 
the same kind of argument, when he scoffed at the “lawyer’s Paradise where all words have a 
fixed, precisely ascertained meaning” and argued that “the fatal necessity of looking outside the 
text in order to identify persons and things, tends steadily to destroy such illusions and to reveal 
the essential imperfection of language, whether written or spoken.” James Bradley Thayer, A 
Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law 428–29 (1898). One exception to 
this dismissive attitude towards concepts was Karl Llewellyn, who did not reject conceptual 
analysis or broad analytical categories, but rejected its use at the level of rule application, espe-
cially if it meant asking courts to answer unanswerable questions. Alan Schwartz, Karl Llewellyn 
and the Origins of Contract Theory, in The Jurisprudential Foundations of Corporate and 
Commercial Law 12, 17 & n.34, 22, 41 (Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt eds., 2000); see also 
Jeanne L. Schroeder, Death and Transfiguration: The Myth That the U.C.C. Killed “Property”, 
69 Temp. L. Rev. 1281 (1996) (arguing that Llewellyn did not discard property concepts when 
eliminating older title analysis). 
 150. Karl N. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals 370 (1960). 
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rest of the contract itself. Llewellyn’s approach to boilerplate, like that of 
the other realists, is ironically too one-size-fits-all in its preference for con-
text over modularity. 
In this approach to contracts, the realists were pursuing a vision closely 
related to their bundle-of-rights picture of property. In the bundle of rights, 
the realists stressed the social purposes of property and thus emphasized the 
relations holding between people and took the focus off property as an in 
rem right to a thing. The realists favored breaking property rights down into 
ever smaller constituent parts (sticks) and redistributing the sticks in accord 
with policy goals.151 In general, the realists systematically ignored informa-
tion costs. So as long as there was any benefit from tailoring or reliance on 
context, only a lack of enlightenment would seem (to them) to stand in the 
way of openness to these context-dependent approaches. Because they saw 
little to recommend formalism, the realists were willing to throw out the 
advantages of invariance to context. 
The realist revolution was never quite complete in the courts and the tide 
has reversed somewhat (and more so in the commentary). But there is one 
arena in which the realists had to live with the consequences of their em-
brace of context and disregard for modularity: their efforts to implement 
their project through writing casebooks on contracts. The goal among real-
ists was to make the study of contracts more responsive to commercial and 
social realities. The more thoroughgoing realist approach went as far as to 
organize contracts casebooks by the subject matter of contracts. For an ex-
treme example, Harold Havighurst’s contracts book proudly announces that 
its “[c]ases are grouped according to subject matter and not according to the 
doctrines employed,”152 and that this will mean that “[t]he part that relation-
ship, circumstance, and custom play in molding the bargain becomes more 
readily apparent.”153 The aim is to bring out contextual connections and to 
avoid conceptualism, both of which push in the direction of lessened modu-
larity.154 True to its word, the book is divided into parts for “Services,” 
“Gratuities,” “Loans,” and “Contracts for the Sale of Goods.”155 The part on 
                                                                                                                      
 151. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 8, at 357–60, 365–66; see also J.E. Penner, The “Bundle 
of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 711, 802–03 (1996). For some realist pronounce-
ments to this effect, see, for example, Arthur Linton Corbin, Taxation of Seats on the Stock 
Exchange, 31 Yale L.J. 429, 429 (1922), which argues: “Our concept of property has shifted . . . . 
‘[P]roperty’ has ceased to describe any res, or object of sense, at all, and has become merely a bun-
dle of legal relations—rights, powers, privileges, immunities.” See also Max Radin, A Restatement 
of Hohfeld, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1141 (1938) (interpreting the Hohfeldian scheme from a legal realist’s 
point of view). For a more recent version, see Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in 
NOMOS XXII 69 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980). 
 152. A Selection of Contract Cases and Related Quasi-Contract Cases, at iii (Har-
old C. Havighurst ed., 1934) [hereinafter Havighurst]. 
 153. Id. 
 154. What the realists wound up doing is not totally nonmodular. Even in bringing in context, 
they did organize by contract subject area. Nevertheless, these groupings of subject matter probably 
were not meant to have the kind of freestanding quality that units in a more traditional casebook 
would have. 
 155. Havighurst, supra note 152, at vii–viii. 
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Services is divided into chapters for “Regular Employment,”156 “Commis-
sion Agents,” “Real Estate Brokers,” “Physicians,” “Services in the Home, 
Care of Sick and Aged,” “Rescues, Recovery of Property, Apprehension of 
Criminals,” and “Building and Construction.”157 And so on (and on). Another 
professedly idiosyncratic book, characteristically entitled Contract in Con-
text, organized the course around a building dispute, with no traditional 
headings.158 The only major current casebook with echoes of this realist tra-
dition is Stewart Macaulay et al.’s Contracts: Law in Action, which mixes 
headings such as “Protecting the Expectation Interest,” “Contract in a Fam-
ily Setting,” “An Introduction to the Law of Consideration,” “Contracts to 
Provide for the Old: Contract and Restitution as a Substitute for an Ex-
tended Family,” “Franchise and Employment Relations,” and “Social 
Control and the Interests of Others.”159 The book partially organizes on the 
basis of subject matter and emphasizes context over general principles. This 
approach does have an organization but foregoes the strong modularity of 
the traditional approach based on principles and doctrines. In an effort to 
battle conceptualism, none of the organizational benefits of concepts can be 
employed. At any given point, any piece of material is potentially related to 
any other. It is difficult on this hyperrealist approach to hive off some mate-
rial and treat it in even a semiautonomous fashion. It is a relatively 
nonmodular approach. 
This realist approach never quite caught on, and I suggest that the reason 
was its disregard for the principle of modularity. Indeed, current casebooks 
look a lot more like the traditional books Havighurst and other ardent real-
ists were trying to supplant. Even Havighurst had to compromise in the 
direction of modularity by including little capsule explanations. For exam-
ple, in the Employment chapter, the Second Edition adds capsules on 
“Unilateral and Bilateral Contracts,” “Objective and Subjective Tests of Con-
tract Formation,” the “Statute of Frauds,” “Quantum Meruit,” “Designation of 
Parties,” “Statutory Provisions,” “Special Interrogatories,” “Consideration,” 
and so on.160  
Because fewer of the benefits of modularity were available on the sub-
ject-matter based approach, many authors did not go this far. Even the 
                                                                                                                      
 156. This is further divided into sections on “Compensation, Wages, Bonuses,” “Quality of 
Work, Conduct of Employee,” “Abandonment of Service, Sickness, Death, Changes in Employer’s 
Business, Duration of the Employment,” “Remedies of Employee,” and “Remedies of Employer.” 
Id. at vii. 
 157. The chapter on Building and Construction is further divided into sections on “The Con-
tract Price, Extras, Cost Plus Contracts,” “Defective Construction, Departure from Specifications,” 
“Delays in Construction and in Payment, Termination and Abandonment,” “Destruction of Work 
Pending Performance,” and “Assignees, Sub-contractors, Laborers, Materialmen, and Surety.” Id. 
 158. Addison Mueller, Contract in Context (1951). The author had set out his views on 
contracts casebooks in Addison Mueller, There Is Madness in Our Methods, 3 J. Legal Educ. 93 
(1950). 
 159. Stewart Macaulay, John Kidwell & William Whitford, 1 Contracts: Law in 
Action, at vii–xiii (2d ed. 2003). 
 160. Harold C. Havighurst, Cases and Materials on the Law of Contracts 5–198 
(2d ed. 1950). 
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radical realist casebooks had to compromise with conceptualism in later 
editions. The failed experiment of organizing contracts casebooks by subject 
matter is a testament to the perils of ignoring the advantages of modularity.  
B. Comparative Contracts and the Seams in the Web of Law 
If the theory based on modularity is correct, then contractual boilerplate 
is in principle not the only way to achieve the benefits of modularity. At 
various points I have mentioned the hostility of many legal realists to con-
ceptualism and formalism alike. In this Section, I give a preliminary sketch 
of the role that concepts play in a modular theory of law. In civil law, modu-
larity is achieved through defining these concepts and providing off-the-rack 
solutions in the civil code. Finally, I turn to how differential formalism 
qualifies the notion that law is a seamless web.  
At one level, concepts and formalism under our definition do go hand in 
hand. The whole point of a concept in traditional conceptualism is its rela-
tive abstractness and autonomy from the messy details of the factual context 
(for example, business dealings in a particular industry). In other words, 
conceptualism is one way (and not the only way) of reducing context-
dependence. Again, because formalism and its reverse, context-dependence, 
are matters of degree, one can err in the direction of too much context-
dependence or too little. And one must ask which actors—private parties, 
judges, legislators, and administrators—are likely to come close to choosing 
whatever the optimal level of context-dependence might be. One assurance 
for getting to the neighborhood of the optimal point is that all of these ac-
tors, more or less, face processing costs, and so will have some tendency to 
look favorably upon modular and formal solutions when interdependencies 
present difficulties. The problem comes when decisions by any of these ac-
tors have implications for contexts which that actor does not directly face. 
One major difference between common and civil law, and German law in 
particular, is that German law, unlike the common law, spells out concepts 
very systematically in legislation.161 Conceptualism (Begriffsjurisprudenz) was 
particularly popular during the formative period of the German Civil Code 
of 1896 (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch), which was a product of the late-
nineteenth century,162 and despite more recent approaches that downplay 
the role of concepts, conceptualism is more pronounced in German law 
                                                                                                                      
 161. See generally John Henry Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction 
to the Legal Systems of Western Europe and Latin America (2d ed. 1985); Alan Watson, 
The Making of the Civil Law 168 (1981). On German law, see, for example, Otto Palandt, 
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (Peter Bassenge et al. eds., 58th ed. 1999), and Introduction to 
German Law (Werner F. Ebke & Matthew W. Finkin eds., 1996). 
 162. It came into force on January 1, 1900. See Konrad Zweigert & Hein Kötz, Intro-
duction to Comparative Law 143–44 (Tony Weir trans., Clarendon Press 3d rev. ed. 1998) 
(1977) (Professor Gustav Radbruch, who went on to become the Minister of Justice of the Weimar 
Republic, opined that the German Civil Code of 1896 was “more ‘the cadence of the nineteenth than 
the upbeat to the twentieth century . . . .’”); see also Carl Baudenbacher, Some Remarks on the 
Method of Civil Law, 34 Tex. Int’l L.J. 333, 340 (1999).  
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than in U.S. law.163 As a result, individual contracts do not have to devote 
much effort to defining these concepts. Some of what a U.S. contract 
would accomplish by means of boilerplate provisions is simply in the 
background civil law in Germany. Claire Hill and Christopher King cite 
this feature of German law along with a more homogeneous legal and 
business culture as reasons why German contracts tend to be shorter than 
their U.S. counterparts.164  
We can hypothesize here that German contracts are modular as well as 
short. The structure of the civil law itself provides for a high degree of 
modularity. To the extent that use of the system is quasi-mandatory, the law 
in Germany pushes parties to a highly modular style of contracting, but 
through off-the-rack law rather than through privately created boilerplate. 
German law allows modules, especially those involving definitions, to be 
omitted from contracts themselves. Both boilerplate provisions and the off-
the-rack provisions of German law achieve modularity, but in very different 
ways. It may also be the case that German law, along with an institutional 
structure in which “notaries” vouch for the enforceability of contracts, pro-
motes a greater degree of modularity than U.S. law.165 Given that the 
contracting context at least until recently has been quite different in Ger-
many, it is beyond the scope of this Article whether a possibly greater 
degree of modularity heavily promoted by the legal system is an advantage 
or not. 
One of the functions of defining concepts is to help differentiate various 
areas of the law from each other. Thus, if property involves exclusion and in 
rem nature, this helps define the scope of property vis-à-vis contract. This 
type of differentiation is ingrained in the civil law tradition but has fallen out 
of favor in common law jurisdictions, especially in the United States. More 
recently, some English philosophers of law, especially those taking up Jo-
seph Raz’s problem of “individuating” laws, have pursued the question of 
defining branches of the law philosophically.166 I suggest that the benefits of 
doing this are closely tied to the role of modularity in managing complexity. 
Recognizing this role of modularity calls into question the often-
repeated metaphor that law is a “seamless web.” This is a well-worn cliché, 
partly because it potentially appeals to those of very different views on con-
ceptualism and formalism.167 To traditional conceptualists and formalists, the 
                                                                                                                      
 163. See, e.g., Baudenbacher, supra note 162, at 336–37. 
 164. Claire A. Hill & Christopher King, How Do German Contracts Do as Much with Fewer 
Words?, 79 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 889 (2004). 
 165. Beurkundungsgesetz [Notarial Authentication Act], Aug. 28, 1969 BGBl. I at 1513, 
§§ 17–21 (F.R.G.). 
 166. Penner, supra note 33, at 32–68; Joseph Raz, The Concept of a Legal System 70–
92, 140–47 (2d ed. 1980).  
 167. Frederic William Maitland, A Prologue to a History of English Law, 14 Law Q. Rev. 13, 
13 (1898) (“Such is the unity of all history that any one who endeavours to tell a piece of it must 
feel that his first sentence tears a seamless web.”); see also Frederick Pollock & Frederic Wil-
liam Maitland, The History of English Law 1 (2d ed. 1899); Ethan Katsh, Law in a Digital 
World: Computer Networks and Cyberspace, 38 Vill. L. Rev. 403, 403–04 (1993) (“This metaphor 
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phrase is cautionary in that a change may have unanticipated consequences. 
realists, who are skeptical about the neatness and coherence implied by the 
traditional invocations of the “seamless web” metaphor, make a case for a 
different sort of seamlessness themselves: a need to look beyond narrow 
doctrine for sensible solutions that take into account how law in general can 
solve social problems.168 To the realists, law is not even autonomous, but 
rather seamlessly connected to social context. 
That law has internal and external connections of this sort is hard to 
deny. But in the case of formalism versus contextualism, the seamlessness 
of law is a matter of degree. Maximum seamlessness implies no benefit to 
modularity. Regardless of whether they explicitly thought of their task this 
way, the conceptualists and traditional treatise writers divided law into sub-
ject areas (and subareas) and distinguished concepts. By differentiating 
areas of law and defining—and limiting—the connections between them 
and between law and its context, the designers of a legal system can achieve 
some of the benefits of modularity in managing complexity. These include 
greater ease of use and more adaptability to certain kinds of change in the 
external environment that call for change in the law itself. Given the central 
role modularity plays in many facets of human existence and its connection 
to limits on human cognition, it would be quite surprising if law called for a 
corner solution of seamlessness. 
Conclusion 
The modularity of boilerplate is but one aspect of a much larger phe-
nomenon that is pervasive throughout law and the rest of human creation of 
artifacts. Ultimately, modularity reflects the limits of human cognition. 
Modularity is a much more promising place to look for the effects of those 
                                                                                                                      
suggests that law not only has an intricate structure, but also that all parts of the law fit together 
smoothly, that each part is linked to every other part and that the whole arrangement grows and 
evolves according to plan.”). 
 168. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. Before arguing that legal norms block consid-
eration of some kinds of information, thus in this Article’s terms increasing modularity, Frederick 
Schauer summarizes the modern view of seamlessness: 
The law is a seamless web, so the old saw goes, but so too is life. Just as the categories and 
concepts of law are pervasively interconnected, the categories with which we divide up the 
world are similarly conjoined. The demarcations that people use to organize their perceptions 
and their lives are not rigid and mutually exclusive, but rather constitute a set of overlapping 
and fuzzy-edged constructs, linked in such a way that changes in the pressure applied at any 
one point in society are likely to reverberate throughout much of the network that is our exis-
tence. 
What makes these interrelationships important to lawyers is that law itself is undeniably part of 
a larger whole. The seamless web of law is one component of the seamless web of life. And if 
the seamless web metaphor is indeed as apt for life as it is for law, then changes in any part of 
our social existence and organization are likely to be reflected not only in the content but also 
in the very nature of law. 
Frederick Schauer, Lawyers and Lawmaking, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1141, 1141 (1985) (reviewing 
Bruce A. Ackerman, Reconstructing American Law (1984)). 
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limits than in many of the deviations from rationality that have received the 
most attention in recent years.169 
One of the most striking implications of the theory and the hypotheses 
offered about boilerplate, contract, and property in this paper is that they 
suggest benefits of formalism that have been overlooked by the realists and 
formalists and their successors alike. Boilerplate is best interpreted in a less 
holistic, context-dependent manner than are contracts more generally. This 
differential formalism suggests that images of the law popular with all these 
types of people are quite misleading. The image of the law as a “seamless 
web” is appealing and has some truth in it, but it misses an important part of 
the picture. What is deeply woven into the structure of the law is the modu-
larity that human minds require in order to make legal artifacts useful. 
Exploiting the benefits of information hiding and portability can be seen as 
consequences of bounded rationality.170 Modularity and other formal devices 
are more important in some areas, like contracts, than in others, like prop-
erty, precisely because these purposes differ from one area to the next. And 
boilerplate is interesting and revealing because it is perched somewhere be-
tween the poles of contract and property. 
                                                                                                                      
 169. See, e.g., Behavioral Law and Economics (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); Russell B. 
Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption 
from Law and Economics, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 1051 (2000). 
 170. This was Herbert Simon’s view, even though he regarded the mind as a general cognition 
device and did not emphasize the modularity of mind itself. See Simon, supra note 13. Modularity 
of artifacts like computer programs, organizations, and law itself can be important to human infor-
mation processors even if the mind itself is not as modular as most cognitive scientists now accept. 
